

SAGAR

South Asian Graduate Research Journal



Volume 11, 2004

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SAGAR

A SOUTH ASIA GRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

Sponsored by
South Asia Institute
Patrick Olivelle, Interim Director
The University of Texas at Austin

Volume 11, Fall 2003

Sagar is published biannually in the fall and spring of each year. The editors are responsible for the final selection of the content of the journal and reserve the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication. Articles presented in the journal do not represent the views of either the South Asia Institute at the University of Texas at Austin or the Sagar editors. Responsibility for the opinions expressed and the accuracy of the facts published in articles and reviews rests solely with the individual authors.

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Editors' Note

For this issue, we thank all the contributors and members of the Editorial Advisory Board. Special thanks to Syed Akbar Hyder, our faculty advisor, for guiding us in this effort; to Patrick Olivelle, the interim-director of the South Asia Institute, for his advice in making this journal a more professional endeavour; and to Eduardo Contreras, for his patience in rendering us immeasurable technical assistance.

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When the East is in the House: The Emergence of Dance Club Culture among Indian-American Youth

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There are over one million people of South Asian¹ descent living in the United States today. Yet while the concept of “India” has been a part of the American vernacular since the beginning, the actual presence of South Asians in America is a relatively recent phenomenon. The American NRI (Non-resident Indian) community was virtually nonexistent until the mid 1960s. After the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, in which the United States abandoned its strict quotas on Asian immigration, the number of Indians coming to the U.S. increased dramatically.² The majority of these new immigrants were professionally trained and, rather than moving to previously established ethnic enclaves, many moved directly into relatively affluent suburban sectors of American society. Their economic success was virtually unprecedented in the history of American immigration, and within a short span of time the Indian community became the wealthiest and most educated ethnic group in America.

The children of these immigrants, the first generation to be raised in the U.S., have reached young adulthood in large numbers in the 1990s. And while the immigrant generation has maintained a preference for Indian culture, often distancing themselves from mainstream American society, the second generation was raised in the U.S. and needs to establish its place in the American mainstream. In this essay, I first discuss the politics of identity among Indian-American youth, a generation searching for a voice but boxed

¹ In this paper, I will focus specifically on youth of Indian descent living in the U.S. Nevertheless Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, and Nepali communities are equally important parts of the South Asian presence in this country. Youth from these communities are sometimes absorbed into the larger social network of Indian-Americans. Furthermore, the sense of a unified “Indian” identity is often thrown into question by religious, regional, and class differences.

² The “Barred Asiatic Zone” Immigration Act of 1917 and the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 (also known as the “National Origins Quota Act”) acted to eliminate nearly all immigration from Asia with the exception of the Philippines, a U.S. territory at the time.

in by labels such as “model minority”³ and “ABCD” (American-Born Confused *Desi*).⁴ Next, I discuss the *desi* music scene and the recent popularity of Hindi film song remixes. Finally, I attempt to connect my understanding of *desi* culture to broader movements in hip-hop culture and then close with some concluding remarks.⁵

THE POLITICS OF DESI IDENTITY

Many of the most powerful theories regarding cultural politics come from Great Britain. While the theories of Stuart Hall (1996), Paul Gilroy (1993), Avtar Brah (1996), and Gayatri Spivak (1987) have been the building blocks of diaspora studies, their theories arose from an environment in which people of Asian and Afro-Caribbean heritage were simultaneously referred to as “black.” Thus, while their theories have been rigorously applied to studies on the South Asian diaspora, it is important to keep in mind that the context of such theories, while transnational in many respects, is at times quite specifically local. In attempting to apply their theories to my experiences with the South Asian community in the U.S., I have concluded that the politics of

³ In an excellent essay on Hindu nationalism in the Indian diaspora, Arvind Rajagopal discusses two problematic issues associated with the term “model minority:”

Although Asians in the United States have been dubbed the ‘model minority,’ often earning degrees and dollars at rates greater than those of the Caucasian majority, the price of their success has been a tacit agreement not to rock the boat and to accept the existing racial hierarchy”Model minority” may ostensibly refer to Asian-Americans, but the unspoken reference is to African-Americans who are the “model” and archetype of the “minority”: dark, unassimilated, and unassimilable (Rajagopal 1997, 51).

Rajagopal argues that the immigrant generation tends to emphasize the “cultural” or religious aspects of their place in American society, but they generally shy away from questions concerning race. When violence against South Asians happens (violent crime against Asian-Americans has risen 500% in the past decade) the common response is to deny any common, essential identity shared with the victims. To draw attention to the violence would draw attention to their own status as a racial minority in the U.S. (Rajagopal 1997, 53).

⁴ The term *desi* comes from the Hindi adjective *deshi*, meaning “Indian” or “local” as opposed to *videshi*, meaning “foreign.” Although not all second-generation South Asian Americans identify with the term *desi*, I use the term throughout this essay to refer to the young, primarily Indian-American students who participate in the dance club culture being discussed here.

⁵ My primary experience comes from interactions with Indian-American students in Austin and Houston, but I conducted interviews in New York, Chicago, over the telephone, and on the Internet in order to gain a broader perspective on “*desi* culture” nationwide.

identity for American *desis* are clearly different from those in Britain.⁶ In the U.K., identity and politics have been fused together so that any discussion of black identity becomes, by default, a political discussion. In the U.S., however, this does not seem to be the case.

Forging an anti-essentialist, unified identity is not considered nearly as resistant or transgressive in America as it seems to be in the British context. Thus, while Sharma et al. (1996) discuss the critical need to recognize the violence of racist Britain against Asians, and the music of Asian Dub Foundation, FunDaMental, and others speaks in such a way that positing an Asian identity automatically becomes anti-mainstream, American *desis* instead hope to create a South Asian American identity that focuses on connections between *desis* on other levels: matters of intergenerational difference, dating and sexuality, and a broader question of the way they fit into the mainstream. The cultural expressions of American *desis*, thus, reflect a more playful approach to identity by focusing on style (commonly drawn from hip-hop culture), humorous stereotypes of “Indianness,” and an appreciation of the beauty of the South Asian body. This is not to say that Indian-Americans are less politically aware than their British counterparts. Rather, I am merely attempting to show that political rhetoric tends to be more overt and urgent in the expressions of South Asian youth culture in Great Britain than in the U.S.

Among the high school and college-aged *desi* crowd, parties are a key place for identities to be expressed, negotiated, and transformed. While going out to public clubs is just as popular with *desis* as with other young adults, a more interesting phenomenon is the massive private party attended almost exclusively by *desis* (and a fair number of students and young professionals who were raised in India). The monthly “Masala Night” parties in Houston are often held at Crystal Nite Club, off of Hillcroft Avenue in an area filled with various Indian businesses. The front room of the club is “the *desi* room,” where the DJs mix Indian music (such as *bhangra* or Hindi film music) with hip-hop and dance music. The large video monitors in the *desi* room broadcast images of Indian popular culture: Hindi film stars, popular music videos, and so on. The back room is dubbed “the New York room,” and the DJs in this room play only rap and hip-hop. The décor of the *desi* room could be described as exotic or tropical, with palm trees hanging over the dance floor. Meanwhile, the New York room transports you to an urban street scene. Traffic signs hang from the walls, and the DJ booth is nested in the

⁶ For an insightful analysis of the notion of race in Indian-American identity, see Kibria 1996.

front of a bus jutting onto the dance floor. Thus, the layout of the club's two rooms reflect the two worlds inhabited by Indian-Americans.

However, the usefulness of the two worlds model is rather limited, not only because it implies that those two worlds are homogeneous (both *desi* culture and hip-hop culture are, in fact, highly differentiated), but also because it understates the truly trans-diasporic flow of ideas, styles, and strategies. Using the two worlds model to analyze cultural expressions such as Hindi film song remixes is bound to fail to recognize the diversity of sources intersecting in such music. The music in the *desi* room is built upon many layers of appropriation and cultural exchange. Hindi film songs may represent the "Indian" side of the *desi* experience, but the music incorporates disco, techno, rock-n-roll, and funk just as often as Indian folk and classical music.

THE ORIGINS OF HINDI REMIX

As the first wave of *desis* reached young adulthood, a number of issues came to bear on the South Asian American community. Concerns of proper social behavior, independence, and dating began to underscore generational differences between *desis* and their parents. During their childhood, the *desi* generation was held together, in part, by the social activities of their parents.⁷ As a critical mass of *desis* reached young adulthood, however, the need for a new social outlet was great. As large numbers of *desis* enrolled in universities throughout the country, many joined together through formal organizations, such as the Indian Students Association. But informal activities, especially dance parties, have come to occupy an equally significant place in the construction of *desi* culture. Dance and music offer an immediately accessible avenue for *desis* to express new worldviews without directly confronting older perspectives.

Bally Sagoo's 1994 release of *Bollywood Flashback* marks the dawn of the Hindi remix era in both Great Britain (Sagoo's home country) and the U.S. However, in the wake of his earlier *bhangra* remixes and amidst an overall growth in the popularity of DJing in the mainstream, several other DJs from both sides of the Atlantic may be able to lay claim to the title of first remixing Hindi film songs. Chicago-based DJs T.S. Soundz and New York's Magic

⁷ In saying this, however, I feel that it is necessary to keep in mind that generational difference does not necessarily imply generational conflict. In fact, throughout my interviews I witnessed examples of healthy communication and respect between generations, even concerning some of the more divisive issues such as sex and drugs.

Mike began mixing Hindi film music in the beginning of the 1990s.⁸ But it was Sagoo who brought international acclaim to this music genre by signing a record deal with Sony Music and landing the first Hindi language song (“Chura Liya”) in the mainstream charts in the UK. Thus, while Bally Sagoo cannot be credited with inventing the Hindi film song remix, his album, *Bollywood Flashback*, provided the inspiration and the standard of quality for all other *desi* DJs.

While the *desi* party scene has been brewing in the U.S. and Canada for almost a decade now, the complexity of the remixes has remained relatively minimal. According to Streetsound’s Morgan Gerard, “Technically speaking, Hindi remix music really isn’t much of a remix at all...Hindi remixes fuse different Western dance tracks into one track with the added attraction of film lyrics filling into the instrumental versions.”⁹ Whereas Bally Sagoo created his remixes entirely from scratch, hiring new vocalists to re-record the older film songs, many of the early American remixes simply featured a drum machine adding new beats to the original recordings. The quality of remixes by North American *desis* has increased steadily over the past ten years, but overall it is true that the British-Asian community has been the primary site of innovation, while Indian-American youth have merely reacted to these movements.

As discussed by Banerjee (1988), Bauman (1990), and Manuel (1995), the pop music scene among South Asians in Great Britain has developed rapidly after the development of *bhangra beat*¹⁰ and other “re-inventions.” In England, several generations of performers, producers, and agents have been active in building up a coherent market. Bally Sagoo was supported by Birmingham’s Oriental Star Agencies and was given the time to develop his own style. And while the South Asian community in England is perhaps more diverse than in the U.S., British-Asians nevertheless gain a greater degree of solidarity because of their visible presence in the mass media and the greater governmental attention they receive as minorities. These three factors—more experience, higher visibility, and a clearer identity as a minority group—have allowed for a rather large and well-connected music market to develop in England. In this environment, it is no surprise that large corporations, such as

⁸ In fact, Bally Sagoo cites Magic Mike as one of the first people to encourage him to mix Hindi film songs. In addition to these and other DJs, it should be noted that some Indian-Americans were involved in hip-hop and rap long before mixing in Indian elements came into vogue.

⁹ Streetsound is an excellent on-line source for information about current DJs and remix styles. Its homepage is <http://www.streetsound.com/>

¹⁰ *Bhangra beat* is a fusion of *bhangra*, a Punjabi folk dance and music, with disco. See Banerji (1988), Baumann (1990), or Bauman and Banerji (1990).

Columbia Records, would want to get involved and sponsor artists such as Bally Sagoo.¹¹

In the U.S., however, South Asian Americans are only now beginning to develop their own popular music market. For the most part, however, *bhangra beat* music is imported from England, and the only area in which American *desis* show a broadly consistent interest is in remixes of *bhangra* and Hindi film songs. Because most American DJs are young college students with limited financial resources, the majority of their remixes are unable to match Bally Sagoo's production capabilities. And while British artists have the option of signing with an Asian record label, such as Oriental Star or Audiorec, most American DJs are forced to put out tapes or CDs themselves. Thus, the demographic and historical differences between these two branches of the South Asian diaspora reveal the interdependent yet differentiated nature of overseas Indian communities.

Connections ought also be made to India itself, since Bollywood culture¹² continues to influence the tastes of Indian-American youth, even among those who may have never been to India. Regarding the "recycling" of Hindi film songs, it is important to note that most of the film songs being remixed are already intended for the dance floor, since most film songs accompany elaborately choreographed dance routines. Also, many of the songs remixed are already hits in India. In fact, numerous *desi* DJs actively follow the music charts in India, and the latest hits from Bombay are quickly remixed and played at *desi* parties in the U.S. The choice of tunes to remix is, of course, also at the discretion of the individual DJ. Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong tendency for most DJs to include in their playlist both the latest hits and other huge hits from the past few years.

Occasionally, however, a DJ will try to come up with a new mix of a relatively unplayed song. This can be a very effective practice, since one of the most common complaints I heard while attending *desi* parties was that "they always play the same stuff." Thus, when a DJ comes across a good tune that seems to have the potential to mix well with other types of music, it becomes a race to get it out before someone else lays claim to re-popularizing the song. Boy Wonder reported to me that many of the most popular songs played at *desi* parties are, in fact, connected to one particular DJ's remix, and

¹¹ Bally Sagoo released several albums on Columbia records, a subsidiary of Sony Music. Sagoo and a Birmingham-based duo known as Distant Voices (also signed by Sony Music) have even had modest hits in India because of Sony's efforts to penetrate the Indian market. American DJs have yet to score such a lucrative deal with a major label.

¹² The film industry in Bombay is often called "Bollywood."

quite often these mixes are played by other DJs. Thus, while a specific song (such as Daler Mehndi's *bhangra* hit "Bolo Ta Ra Ra") may be remixed by dozens of DJs, it is one particular version (such as Lil'Jay's remix) that serves as the model or definitive recording.

As we saw in Morgan Gerard's criticism of Hindi remixes, the music is quite often a simple fusion of two tracks: a Hindi film song and an American dance or hip-hop track. Furthermore, the mixing often takes place in advance. At the party itself, many *desi* DJs simply play out the pre-recorded remix and, on occasion, add scratches or additional beats from the second turntable. The necessity of using pre-recorded mixes is primarily due to the scarcity of Hindi film music on vinyl. Many DJs rely on cassette or compact disc releases from Bombay for the film music originals. This also affects the DJ's choice of materials to remix, since the music from older films is sometimes difficult to find, while the music from the latest films is readily available. Thus, much like their counterparts who spin other styles of music, *desi* DJs tend to be record connoisseurs, scouring everything from their parents's record collections to the latest imports at specialty record stores.

AN EXAMPLE OF A HINDI REMIX

I would like to focus on one of the more effective remixes that I have come across in my research. The original Hindi film song for this remix is "Main Hoon Pyar Tera" from the film *Teesri Manzil* ("The Third Floor") and is sung by the legendary Mohammad Rafi. The music was written by the famous film music composer R.D. Burman, to whom Bally Sagoo's *Bollywood Flashback* was dedicated.

"Main Hoon Pyaar Tera" from *Teesri Manzil* (1969)

aa jaa aa jaa
 (Come, Come)
main huun pyaar teraa
 (I am your love)
allah allah
 (Oh God)
inkaar teraa
 (Your denial.)

In the film, the scene occurs in a rock-n-roll club in which Rocky, the protagonist (played by Shammi Kapoor), flirts with the alluring heroine (Asha

Parekh) by winking, smiling, begging, pouting, and eventually singing. The ensuing song and dance presents a collage of references: Elvis-like poses, dancing and shaking reminiscent of *Beach Blanket Bingo*, and a surf rock accompaniment. While watching such a spectacle in earnest may be a challenge for the typical *desi*, and laughter or embarrassment may be unavoidable, Dallas-based DJ Sanj's 1997 remix of "Main Hoon Pyar Tera" is far from "cheezy." Actually, it is cheezy but with a cool, intentionally "retro" twist. On an album entitled *Classix*, DJ Sanj, co-founder of Asian Boyz Club Productions, mixes Rafi's voice with "Le Freak" by the group, Chic.

As with many Hindi remixes, Sanj edits out the genuinely cheezy breaks in the original, where screeching violins and surf rock guitar licks reinforce the stereotype that Indian pop culture is always behind the times. In the place of the original breaks, Sanj inserts the intentionally cheezy chorus of "Le Freak," a disco track that was previously recycled in hip-hop music by The Sugar Hill Gang. Sanj's approach to the remix represents a standard formula for many *desi* DJs. The original film song may already have a pretty good beat and an appealing melodic hook, but the use of strings (especially the violins in the highest register) in the breaks between verses does not seem to sit well with most American-raised listeners. Thus, the DJ very often will substitute a hip-hop or dance loop during the break and then bring the original tune back in when the vocals return.

On the next track of DJ Sanj's *Classix* album, he mixes "O Saathi Re," from the Hindi film *Muqqaddar ka Sikandar* ("The Luck of Alexander"), with "Point of No Return," a 1985 hit by the group Nu Shooz. Keeping with the contemporary preference of a certain section of trendy young Americans for relishing in the cheezy, Sanj chooses a tune that, because of its clearly dated sound, will be both danceable and playfully campy for most listeners. The retro music scene has continued to grow over the past few years. In Austin, for example, Retro Rage night at Club Paradox attracts some of the most hip and stylish youth in town, while the opening of Polly Esthers retro dance club proves that cheeziness is a lucrative business! Sunil T, the man behind Houston's Masala Night parties, has thrown numerous retro parties which were called "Karma—The Reincarnation," ironically appropriating the notion of rebirth central to Hindu spirituality.

DJ Sanj's remixes of "Main Hoon Pyaar Tera" and "O Saathi Re" draw from just the right kind of out-of-date fashion to convince the *desi* listener of its intentional cheeziness. Obviously, not everything old is cheezy. Unintentional cheeziness often stands out because it lacks the sense of self-reflective humor evident in Sanj's remixes or the fashions of Retro Rage partygoers at Club Paradox. Thus, the subtleties between "good cheese" and "bad cheese" would be difficult to grasp for someone not raised in the same

environment. The humor of Sanj's remix, for example, could only be understood by an insider, yet again reinforcing the gap between American-raised *desis* and their parents or their "FOB" peers.¹³

Behind the cheeziness of such remixes lies a layer of nostalgia, something that I think is shared by many of the hip-hop derived musics of today. The playful re-appropriation of the past is also a yearning for more immediate connections to a time that may seem better, more meaningful, or more genuine. Whether the remix is done by Bally Sagoo or Puff Daddy, the effect is to allow the listener to reclaim the past for the purposes of the present, not simply to imagine what it was like "back then" but to participate in the past by actually performing it. While the notion of nostalgia may not be entirely new to art, I feel that the advent of sampling technology and its application by early hip-hop artists constitutes an essential aspect of the aesthetics of Hindi film song remixes. With so many layers of meaning involved, the hybrid cultural products of the Indian diaspora cannot be characterized merely as a fusion of East and West. Rather, diasporic cultural production takes place at the intersection of multiple social, historical, and technological fields.

As Paul Gilroy has convincingly shown in *The Black Atlantic* (1990), diasporic culture is founded on webs of "affiliation and affect" in which the home country itself becomes a part of the diaspora so that all members of the "Black Atlantic" interact and exchange cultural materials in a web-like rather than linear fashion. Likewise the highly differentiated South Asian diaspora exists as an organic system in which transnational exchanges flow throughout the diaspora, picking up other materials along the way, and often cycling back to their home in modified, unrecognizable forms. Thus, the Hindi remix genre came about not as a direct evolution of house *bhangra*, but through the complex interaction of British, Indian, Canadian, American, West Indian, and African-American influences that inform both a DJ's personal experience and place in the diasporic network of South Asian cultures.

DESI AND HIP-HOP CULTURE

The collection of fashion, music, dance styles, language, and art that are encompassed by the term "hip-hop" has come to reflect the emergence of a new global youth culture. Hip-hop has become a global social movement based on a lifestyle that, while clearly rooted in urban black and Latino

¹³ Some Indian-Americans mock recent immigrants from India by calling them "FOBs" (Fresh Off the Boat). There is, at times, a great deal of antagonism between the two groups, but very little has been written on this subject.

culture, has been extracted from its particular historical and geographic roots and is now universalized. The popularity of hip-hop is increasing among youth in Africa (Remes 1999), Europe (Elfein 1998), and indeed everywhere (Mitchell 2001).

Hip-hop is not so much a specific style of music as an approach to making music. The basis of this approach is the sample. In an age of electronic reproduction, hip-hop artists make full use of technology, borrowing sounds and images from across the globe. For this reason, the hip-hop approach seems to fit well with the worldview of second generation Indian-Americans. Hip-hop is a sample heavy, intertextual music. Likewise, the lives of most *desis* are filled with samples of South Asian culture intermittently taking over the groove of their otherwise mainstream American lives.

Digital sampling allows the DJ to paste together sonic metaphors for a better world or at least a different world. Hip-hop artists rewrite history through their music. According to Mark Anthony Neal, today's generation of black youth experience a post-activist nostalgia and use hip-hop to reconstruct history and community:

The erosion of the Black Public Sphere provided the chasm in which the hip-hop generation was denied access to the bevy of communally derived social, aesthetic, cultural, and political sensibilities that undergirded much of black communal struggle throughout the twentieth century, fracturing the hip-hop generation and the generations that will follow from the real communal history of the African-American diaspora. It is within this context that mass culture fills the void of both community and history for contemporary black youth culture, as it becomes a terrain in which contemporary hip-hop artists conflate history and memory in an effort to reconstruct history. (Neal 1999, 153-154)

While I would question the existence a single "real" communal history of the African-American diaspora, I find his analysis compelling because of the manner in which it resonates with the experience of many *desis*. Both groups live their everyday lives in a world that was radically recast by the actions of their parents. Young African-Americans raised in the post-Civil Rights era do not find the same images of community that their parents developed. Likewise, second generation Indian-American youth did not experience the displacement of immigration and must imagine the radical transformation of

society brought about by the migration of thousands of individuals from Asia to the West.

Hip-hop also reflects a larger section of society. That is, today's teenage generation in general is the first to be raised in a global village where images and sounds from across the globe are a part of their everyday lives. I think, then, that it is wrong to think of *desi* appropriations of hip-hop as a conscious form of opposition. Drawing on black music may not feel all that political for most *desis*. Rather, hip-hop is the mainstream sound, so it's only natural that they get involved. As DJ Boombhai reminded me, "Hip-hop is pop." For a generation of Indian-Americans raised as much on "Yo-MTV Raps" as on Indian devotional songs or Hindi film music, a song like Jazzy Jeff and the Fresh Prince's "Parents Just Don't Understand" must have felt as if it was written just for them.

Hip-hop culture evokes a global consciousness for *desis* that goes far beyond the simple models of generational conflict or East versus West in identity formation. Yet we must keep in mind the arena in which these interactions take place: primarily through mass mediated experiences. In real life the groups rarely interact. Samples, loops, and beats cross the boundaries of race, class, and gender with ease, but in high schools and colleges across the country, social pressures often dictate that teens stay amongst their own. There has been very little written on direct collaborations between *desis* and African-Americans. Yet many DJs learned at least some of their skills while apprenticing under a black DJ.

While politically charged rap music will continue to be an essential force for resistance and social commentary, recent explorations in hip-hop have been more playful, optimistic, enthusiastic, and less politically charged. I feel that as we enter the new millennium, the hip-hop nation represents a *fin-de-siecle* optimism about a new culture, a global culture that, while rooted primarily in African-American culture, enables people of all backgrounds to have a voice. The impact of this movement can be found in a wide variety of musics, especially in transnational, hybrid musics such Hindi remixes.

On one level, *desi* dance music reflects the growing independence of the *desi* generation and provides a background for social gatherings. DJ Jiten states, "I don't think most people come to a dance for the music or the DJ. They're mostly concerned about nice-looking girls and guys and "Am I going to meet somebody?"¹⁴ In my discussions with students in Austin, nearly everyone admitted that *desi* parties are "meat markets." But many people went on to say that there's nothing unusual about that. One student argued that

¹⁴ <http://www.streetsound.com/bhangra/interjiten83>

“checking each other out,” flirting, and “hooking up” are a part of practically all parties on college campuses. DJ Krupt took a more positive outlook, saying that many *desis* may think about hooking up, but for him, DJing is an art.

Thus, while the music provides the backdrop of a typical dance party, the music also symbolically narrates the event and allows *desis* to create a new sense of community. According to DJ Chas Fernandez, “At the dance you have East Indian kids who are trying to express themselves in a new world, with something separate from the Indian tradition but yet very much a part of the Indian tradition” (LeBlanc 1993, 49). The music locates the dancers in a certain place and time while simultaneously articulating a transnational, timeless collection of multiple identities. Hindi film song remixes are truly hybrids of hybrids. When a style of music as eclectic as the Bollywood film song is used to signify tradition, these are truly postmodern times.

I would like to offer one final perspective on the issues of identity formation and negotiation confronted in this paper. It seems to me that Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagination (1991) could be extended beyond the level of community to include the notions of geography and dialogue. These concepts might be read into the context of the *desi* dance scene. While many *desis* at the dance club may not fully understand the Hindi lyrics or know the film from which the song was taken, I believe that nearly all *desis* write India into their senses of self and forge collective identifications with India during performative events. This identification, perhaps similar to Erlmann’s “global imagination” (1996), is what I call an “imagined geography.” Beyond multi-local identifications, I feel that participating in club culture gives *desis* a powerful, symbolic voice with which to express themselves to their parents, their non-*desi* peers, mainstream American culture, and even India itself. By hitting the dance floors, *desis* map the boundaries between cool and lame, in and out. They also draw from the social conceptions of dance clubs in which drinking, drug use, and sexual promiscuity figure strongly. In the hyper-technologized realm of the dance club, where swirling clouds of smoke and flashing lasers accompany musical styles known as “techno” and “jungle,” young South Asian bodies proclaim themselves as glamorous, assertive, and even, to the dismay of their aunts, sexually active. Even if only by association, *desis* imbue their dance club experience with a sense of danger and freedom that speaks through actions even more than words to the generation gap between themselves and their parents.

CONCLUSIONS

The topic of this essay is not simply hybridity, the fusing of East and West, but rather a constellation of multiply-layered hybridities. The music I have discussed, Hindi film song remixes, reflects a historical moment in which ABCDs (American-Born Confused *Desis*) have begun to participate in American public culture. Yet I would argue against the notion that *desis* are confused, or that there is something inherently wrong or unstable about such hybrid cultures. Rather, I believe that all cultures are hybrid, fused from past histories that are inextricably connected. All cultures are dynamic networks of everyday interactions (both interpersonal and technologically-mediated), interpretations, and representations.

As we have seen, the first generation of American-born *desis* is just now reaching adulthood. Important questions of social identity, community definition, and political affiliation loom ahead as they enter the workplace, move throughout the country, and start families of their own. If Indian-Americans hope to overcome the often absurd stereotypes cast on them by the mainstream media, and if they desire a stronger political voice in American politics, they will surely need to forge alliances among themselves. The networks enacted through social events such as Indian Students Association presentations and *desi* dance parties are helping to generate a new sense of community for young *desis*. *Desi* dance music allows this generation to play the field of hybridity and be comfortable and cool without feeling that they are denying their Indian heritage. Today's Indian-American youth are claiming a space within mainstream culture, and by doing so, they alter the shape of that culture. As Bally Sagoo states:

Before you were embarrassed to blast an Asian tune in your car 'cos the people were looking, and now you want to blast that tune out and show people, say "listen to this beat line" and "listen to this track." You know, I had to wind up the windows when I was blasting an Indian track a few years ago because it was, "What's this sound?" Now it's like "Wow, what's that sound?" (Sharma 1996, 91)

The recent work in diaspora studies points out a need for a new theory for post-migration identity formation. The socio-historical environment faced by American-born *desis* is radically different from the environment of the

migrant generation. Thus, it is extremely problematic to apply theories of identity and migration to the American-born generation. In several of the publications on *bhangra* music, and on diasporic musical production in general, the hybridity of diasporic musical forms is said to derive from the position of being an immigrant in a foreign land. Peter Manuel, for example, argues that the pastiche of forms evident in South Asian diasporic music, such as Apache Indian's *bhangramuffin* music, reflects "the migrant's sense of rootlessness and dislocation" (Manuel 1995, 235). Yet Apache Indian, Bally Sagoo, DJ Sanj, and the other producers of South Asian diasporic pop culture are far from being rootless migrants. Rather, they have multiple roots. Finally, the concepts of both "foreign" and "indigenous" are merely inventions that obscure vast networks of interaction and pervasive internal differentiation.

Returning to the label "ABCD," an important argument presented in this paper is that a post-modern, decentered self is not necessarily an unstable, confused self. While scholars may read a cut-n-mix culture as fragmented and label its cultural expressions (such as the music discussed in this paper) as "pastiche" or even "a wasteland of semantic debris," I argue that most *desis* are just as comfortable in their webs of identity as anyone else in this hybrid country. It is wrong to classify *desis* as rootless or dislocated. They are not migrants. They are, like all of us, the product of centuries of cultural hybridity, emerging from and continually creating a culture of many cultures.

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Tat Khalsa Use of Non-traditional Educational Tools in the Ascendancy of the Khalsa Sikh Identity

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The colonization of India introduced new concepts into the subcontinent; the result was a widespread rise in efforts to define an individual's religious identity. This paper will focus on one aspect of this increase in the concern over religious identity. The Sikh *panth* (community) underwent an identity crisis similar to one that many Hindu sects were experiencing. One major vehicle for change in the various religious traditions of this period was the religious *sabha* (society or assembly). Like Hindu reform and reconstruction movements, Sikhs also organized a religious *sabha*. I argue that the primary issue for debate over Sikh identity was the Singh Sabha; in particular the *sabhās* associated with the Tat Khalsa (true Khalsa) influenced the ensuing reforms. The establishment, control, and use of the educational system and associated entities were key factors in the ascendancy of the Khalsa Sikh identity. This paper will deal primarily with less institutional forms of education. Many factors contributed to the consolidation of Sikh identity into that of the Khalsa Sikhs. The Tat Khalsa specifically, and Khalsa Sikhs in general, led the way in the Panjab with creative uses of all types of education.

INTRODUCTION

If one is to define a religious tradition, the question arises—In which historical moment is the definition to be grounded? The teachings of Nanak, given in person to his first group of disciples, may inspire a twentieth century Sikh, but Nanak would certainly not recognize the sight of an unshorn Sikh carrying the *Adi Granth* over his head in the Golden Temple. The questions this paper addresses are—What historical period should be discussed, and how did the definition of Sikhs and their religious tradition in the colonial period influence their future?

In his book, *A History of the Sikh People*, Gopal Singh refutes several definitions of Sikhism. He rejects characterizations of Sikhism as “an

offshoot of the Bhakti movement,” “a synthesis of the fundamentals of Hindu Bhakti and Muslim Sufi-ism,” “Punjabi nationalism,” and “a Hindu challenge to the growing might of Islam” (Singh 1988, 1-3). While Singh is correct that Sikhism cannot be reduced to any of these simple statements, each of these illuminates part of the truth. Sikhism does bear a resemblance to the Bhakti movement; it does share some aspects with Sufism; Punjabi nationalism is associated in some cases with Sikhs; Sikhs did challenge Muslims. Singh is correct in referring to these characterizations as superficial; Sikh identity is more complex than any one of these phrases suggests.

HISTORY

Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, was educated by a Hindu *pandit* and a Muslim *maulvi*, learning both Hindu and Muslim literature in secular and spiritual arenas. Tradition states that Nanak refused the sacred thread, a right of his high-caste birth. He married young and had two children. Later in his life Nanak had a mystical experience. Upon entering a river to bathe he disappeared; tradition states that he was assumed into heaven and given a mission by God. Upon his return he uttered the phrase, “There is no Hindu, no Muslim.” Nanak appeared in court wearing a *mukta*, a cotton cord worn by *faqirs* to denote renunciation. In the traditional account of the Nanak’s life we see influences of both Hindu and Muslim traditions.

Under the leadership of the nine gurus that followed Nanak the Sikh tradition began to grow and change, dramatically at times. The tension between the distinctiveness of Sikhism and the tendency of people to resist change is seen in the formative period of Sikhism. Multiple notions of what it meant to be a Sikh were advanced, and this created multiple interpretations of the Sikh tradition. Singh shows one example in recognizing that there is “so much in the writings of Nanak on which a cult of asceticism could be built (as his son, Sri Chand, did)” (Singh 1988, 147). This illustrates that multiple interpretations and identities arose in the tradition at an early date.

Each of the nine gurus added to the tradition and created new elements of Sikh identity. For example, Guru Amardas began the shrine tradition, and Guru Hargobind incorporated a political dimension into the *panth*. In this way each guru shaped and molded new concepts of identity, changing perceptions of what it meant to be a Sikh. Although, these new elements frequently made Sikhism distinct from Hinduism and Islam, many practices remained unchanged from, if not identical to, Hindu or Islamic practices.

Singh praises Guru Angad for fulfilling the intent of Nanak by helping and guiding men who “do not easily give up their caste and custom and merge in a new society unless there is strict guidance over a long period” (Singh

1988, 147). This assertion is problematic because some of the practices that remained in Sikh culture from the Hindu tradition accounted for many aspects of Sikh identity. All the gurus married within their own caste, despite the Sikh ideal of a casteless society. There are tales in the *Dasam Granth* similar in style to the Hindu *Puranas*, despite the Sikh aversion to Hindu religious literature. These and other survivals from Hindu traditions cannot be ignored; nevertheless Singh glosses over these remaining Hindu elements. At this early stage Sikh identity is still quite tied up in its Hindu origins.

The last guru, Gobind Singh, contributed most to the redefinition of Sikh identity. He created the Khalsa order, a subdivision of Sikhs identified by an initiation ritual and certain physical signs of membership. Reasons for the formation of the Khalsa are difficult to apprehend; however, because those reasons are central to the latter question of identity, this topic is worth exploring. In documenting the life of Guru Gobind Singh, Gopal Singh states that he “decided to evolve an order which would keep as its ideal of life nothing but sacrifice for the cause of *dharma*, and would not accept either for themselves nor for others slavery, either political, or social, or economic” (Singh 1988, 283-284). Rajinder Kaur states the intent slightly differently.

It was to instill a spirit of courage, sacrifice and brotherhood, to meet any challenge, that Guru Gobind Singh . . . created the Khalsa Panth . . . all this was done by Guru Gobind Singh to create a martial atmosphere and an expectancy of military action. Guru Gobind Singh appeared to be a great psychologist and he knew the technique of forging, among his followers, a sense of togetherness and identity. He provided them with symbols which transformed their physical appearance and gave them a new name which signified the distinct identity. (Kaur 1992, 21-22)

Harjot Oberoi expresses a different opinion. He recognizes the difficulty in determining the exact nature of the Khalsa under Gobind Singh, but states “the Khalsa was instituted to finally end the ambiguities of Sikh religiosity” (Oberoi 1994, 59).

The Sikhs would henceforth, at least normatively, be able to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘the others.’ These distinctions were inscribed through a complex cultural repertoire made up of inventive rituals, codes of conduct, mythical narratives and a whole new classificatory code regarding the body.” (Oberoi 1994, 59)

It is clear from all three of these authors that the creation of the Khalsa was either a deliberate attempt to forge a new identity, or an attempt to solidify an existent identity in a culture that desired a concrete religious identity.

Guru Gobind Singh contributed the most important factor to the definition of Sikh identity; nevertheless this contribution did not represent the identity of all Sikhs. The Khalsa was a small group at the time of its inception, initially composed of only five Sikhs. When Guru Gobind Singh was killed, the Khalsa was not a majority in the Sikh *panth*, merely a well-renowned minority. In another radical change to Sikh identity, Guru Gobind Singh decided that the living Guru tradition would end with him; there would be no successors to the leadership of the *panth*. From this point forward the Sikh *panth* would rely on the guidance of the *Guru Granth Sahib*, the scripture of the Sikhs, the living embodiment of the divine will. In addition to the guidance of the *Guru Granth Sahib*, the Sikh *panth*, as a unified community, would serve as an authority.

The ascendancy of the Khalsa Sikh grew with Banda Bahadur, a disciple of Gobind Singh. He took the militancy of the order, resulting from the last few centuries of oppression at the hands of the Mughals, and used it in the struggle to gain Sikh independence. In waging this war against the Mughals, Bahadur spread the Khalsa ideal and established small political units known as *misls*. By the end of the eighteenth century the Khalsa Sikhs had control of most of the Punjab.

During this period non-Khalsa Sikhs were not alienated despite their choice not to join the Khalsa. Sikhs who chose not to enter the Khalsa were called Sahajdharis. There is some speculation that the Udasis—a widely patronized segment of the Sahajdharis—was founded by Sri Chand, the son of Guru Nanak mentioned previously. Regardless of examples like this, it is clear that members of several sub-traditions within Sikhism, all of whom were referred to as Sahajdharis, survived the political ascendancy of the Khalsa Sikh. By the time of the colonial period the Sikh *panth* was a diverse community, more accurately described as many diverse communities. Each faction, however, was recognized by others as Sikh. While elements of the identity crisis that was to arise in the colonial period are found prior to the colonial period, the majority of Sikhs were apparently not disturbed by the diversity within the Sikh *panth*. The factors that influenced this change will be dealt with shortly.

At opposite poles of the Sikh world were the Khalsa Sikhs, followers of the order initiated by Gobind Singh, and the highly custom-driven Sanatan Sikhs, who combined practices of monotheistic Sikhism with those of Hindu *bhakti*. The Khalsa Sikhs were recognized by their observance of the physical

markers of Khalsa identity known as the five K's: *kesh* (long, unshorn hair), *kangha* (comb), *kara*, (steel bracelet), *kachha* (shorts), and *kirpan* (ceremonial sword or dagger). Additionally they shared several ideological concerns which separated them from many of the Sahajdharis such as adherence to the purity laws adopted by Gobind Singh; insistence on one divine teacher, God; and an insistence on the corruption inherent in the Hindu or Muslim practices such as honoring men as divine incarnations, pilgrimages, and living gurus. Sanatan Sikhs, one the other hand, included those who followed the teachings of Nanak, with any interpretation. Some went so as far as to declare that all Sikhs were Hindus. The beliefs of the majority of Sikhs at that time lay somewhere along this wide continuum. The definition of Sikhism was necessarily vague, inclusive, and dependent upon the particular community under discussion.

The details of these definitions will be examined more closely in my discussion of the identity crisis met by Sikhs in the colonial period. I will discuss the nature of Sikhism prior to and during this period, by examining the views of Sikhs who debated these issues.

COLONIAL IMPACT: WESTERN EDUCATION AND RELIGION

British control brought two major factors that would impact religions in India—the proselytism of Christian missionaries and Western ideas of education. Bernard Cohn describes the British understanding of education.

The British conceived of education as taking place in institutions, meaning buildings with physically divided spaces marking off one class of students from another, as well as teachers from students. There were to be fixed positions of professors, teachers, and assistants, who taught regular classes in subjects. The students's progress had to be regularly examined to measure their acquisition of fixed bodies of knowledge. (Cohn 1996, 49)

This contrasted sharply with the historical Indian model of the teacher-student relationship, which was seen as a one-on-one relationship.

The key to understanding the impact of British education is to realize the control that the British East India Company, the entity introducing these values, had over India. The Company, and later the British government, represented the best opportunities for social and economic success in the form of government or company jobs. If an Indian wanted to work for the British East India Company or hold even a local government appointment he required

a Western education. In the localized case of Sikhs, the control of education was key to the identity of a people. The impact of the British concept of education is clearly seen in the development of a young Indian intelligentsia. Indian youths became aware of the value of British education and Western thought.

While the Calcutta Madrasa and the Sanskrit College in Banaras were run by intellectuals interested in the preservation of Hindu culture, they were not associated with religious groups. There were many missionary schools, however, which mixed religion and education. Indians considered education a ticket to success; missionaries considered it an opportunity for conversion. The result of missionary education would exceed both expectations (See Oberoi 1994, 260-264). According to Spencer Lavan,

the educational encounter did not provide sudden enlightenment leading to a repudiation of Hinduism or conversion to Christian orthodoxy. It represented instead a developing realization by a new generation of Hindus of the benefits of English education as well as a renewed awareness of the potential value of long forgotten Hindu roots. (Lavan 1998, 3)

Lavan describes the environment at the “intersection of these forces” as a “Bengali Renaissance” (ibid.). The appropriation of Western writings, scholars, and methods, gave this Indian intelligentsia more tools in their education and debates. Although they learned from the West, they did not naively accept the West as a newer, better way, but incorporated these new ideas as needed for their own concerns.

One of the most influential educational institutions established in the Punjab, especially for Sikhs, was the Anjuman-i-Punjab, or Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. G.W. Leitner came to India in 1864 and assumed the principalship of the Government College at Lahore. In 1865 he helped found the Anjuman. In both roles he acted as a proponent of both indigenous education and vernacular languages. The involvement of Sikhs with the Anjuman was significant for several reasons. Initially the men who would become the great leaders in the latter part of the nineteenth century were educated at Anjuman. Men like “Khem Singh Bedi, Attar Singh Bhadaur, and Professor Gurmukh Singh, honed their skills at oratory, public campaigns and government lobbying at the forums established by the Anjuman” (Oberoi 1994, 231). The Anjuman helped establish a library in the Punjab at a time when printed materials were scarce. The reform activities and educational methods, as well as energy, spread from the Anjuman with its students as they took more active roles in reform.

SOCIETIES

It is in this setting that the Brahmo Samaj, the first of many societies, was established. In these groups the influences of Western education and Hindu reform met. The Charter of 1833, which repealed all restrictions on Christian mission activity, was a catalyst for the growth of these movements. Due to subsequent unrestricted Christian proselytizing in India, most of the movements focused their energy on anti-missionary propaganda. Another movement, central to the study of the Singh Sabha, was the Arya Samaj. The Arya Samaj represented reformed Hinduism as envisioned by its founder Svami Dayananda Saraswati. The intelligentsia of the Punjab made up a large portion of the membership of the Lahore Arya Samaj. This will be significant when we examine the involvement of Sikhs in these movements. Upon the death of Dayananda, the Lahore Arya Samaj began an effort to establish a college as a memorial to Dayananda. The Dayananda Anglo-Vedic High School opened in June of 1886 and became a college within three years. With a combination of Vedic Hinduism and a British style education, the college established a model for indigenous curriculum. They fused the best of the British system with Hindu principles and produced a powerful tool for educating and converting, as well as preparing people for success in an ever-changing Indian atmosphere.

Sikhs in the Punjab, following the example of the Arya Samaj, developed a similar educational environment. It will be helpful here to first examine Sikh parallels to the Hindu Samaj movement and the intersections that occurred between them. In his essay on the Singh Sabha, N. Gerald Barrier writes that "one of the most significant consequences of the British penetration involved changes in the ways Punjabis viewed themselves and their traditions" (Barrier 1998, 196). Sikhs participated in this "new intellectual climate," and underwent the same reevaluations of their tradition as Hindus. Sikhs such as Ditt Singh, Jawahir Singh, and Maya Singh, belonged to the Arya Samaj and were attracted by the success of the Samaj in empowering the Punjabi people. Initially Sikhs cooperated with the Arya Samaj, but Sikhs gradually left to establish their own organization, the Singh Sabha. Reports conflict regarding whether the animosity seen in Arya Samaj attacks on the Sikhs coincided with or followed the departure of the Sikhs. This hostility, and subsequent ideological split, most likely developed from negative perceptions of Sikhism shared by some of the Samaj leaders, particularly Lala Guru Datta, Pandit Lekh Ram, and Lala Murli Dhar (Oberoi 1994, 287).

SINGH SABHA

The spark for the formation of the Singh Sabha occurred in 1873. Four Sikh students made a public announcement of their intentions to convert to Christianity. This was not the first conversion; however, Sikhs who were conscious of the import of this public announcement and concerned about the future of Sikhism organized a meeting to discuss these issues. The urge to defend traditional cultural values against the changes sweeping across the Punjab—such as the import of Western education and other forms of modernization and westernization—contributed to the formation of the Sri Guru Singh Sabha. Its first meeting was in Amritsar; subsequent meetings took place in the Manji Sanib, a Sikh Shrine located near the Golden Temple. Five years later another Singh Sabha was established in Lahore. By 1900, over one hundred groups associated with the Singh Sabha had been established across the Punjab.

The two pivotal chapters among the one hundred Sabhas were the Lahore and Amritsar Sabhas. Although each chapter acted independently and thereby had its own character, the goals of all chapters were the same. Rajiv Kapur lists ten “principles delineating the Sabhas’s activities.”

- (1) The purpose of the Singh Sabha is to arouse love of religion among the Sikhs.
- (2) The Sabha will propagate the true Sikh religion everywhere.
- (3) The Sabha will print books on the greatness and truth of the Sikh religion.
- (4) The Sabha will propagate the words of the Guru.
- (5) The Sabha will publish periodicals to further the Punjabi language and Sikh education.
- (6) Individuals who oppose Sikhism, who have been excluded from the Sikh holy spots or who have associated with other religions and broken Sikh law cannot join the Sabha. If they repent and pay a fine, they can become members.
- (7) English officers interested in Sikh education and the well being of Sikhism can associate with the Sabha, also those who support Punjabi language.
- (8) The Sabha will not speak against other religions.
- (9) The Sabha will not discuss matters related to the Government.

(10) The Sabha will respect well wishers of the community, those who love Sikhism, and those who support truth and education in Punjabi. (Kapur 1986, 16-17)

One need only read this list with the diversity of the Sikh community in mind to realize the problems that were to occur. Alliances within the Sikh community split Sikhs along ideological lines. Soon the Sabhas became polarized over how to define the ideas inherent in the ten principles listed above. Lahore and Amritsar became the two centers of Singh Sabha activity. I will now elaborate the dimensions and causes of the split.

Membership, particularly leadership and financial support, is important for understanding the two poles of the Singh Sabhas. The Maharaja of Faridkot, Bikram Singh, a wealthy supporter, backed the Amritsar chapter. Additionally, the Amritsar chapter had the endorsement of the descendents of Nanak himself. On the other hand, the Lahore chapter did not have illustrious or wealthy supporters.

This contrast is evident in the leadership as well. The *gyanis*, *bhais* (religious personages), and aristocracy formed much of the leadership of the Amritsar chapter—men such as Thaku Singh Sandhawalia, Khem Singh Bedi, his son Gurbaksh Singh, and Kanwar Bikram Singh. Each drew their eminence from different milieu—the *bhais* from religious charisma, the *bedis* from their belonging to the same *jat* as Nanak, and the aristocracy from their high-caste position. Nevertheless, they all represented the upper-end of the social pecking order. The Lahore chapter, on the other hand, drew much of its leadership from the new intelligentsia described above. Bhai Datt Singh is a good example. Because he was from a low caste, he had a different perspective than the leadership of the Amritsar chapter. The main characteristic shared by the Lahore leadership was not social position, as in the Amritsar chapter, but a “shared experience of Anglo-vernacular education and participation in intellectual debate in Lahore” (Barrier 1998, 199).

Oberoi suggests that it is an oversimplification to characterize the Amritsar chapter as aristocracy and landed gentry, and the Lahore chapter as low-caste and intelligentsia. A prime counter-example to these characterizations from the Amritsar chapter was Giani Hazara Singh, a renowned scholar of Sikh literature, who was educated in Sanskrit, Braj, Persian, and Urdu. Moreover, the multifaceted nature of any community is reflected in its leadership. The case of the Lahore and Amritsar chapters of the Singh Sabha is no different. The question remains whether this simple characterization adequately describes the character of each chapter. While Oberoi’s caution is well taken, I believe that his characterization is indicative of the driving mentality of the two chapters. For example, although Bhai Ditt

Singh was a proponent of a caste-less society, it is clear that the Amritsar chapter was affected by the conservatism of its major supporters. The doctrinal differences hinted at by this distinction are another major factor in the split between these two chapters.

The most significant distinction rests on the question of Sikh identity. The Amritsar chapter claimed that a Sikh is anyone who accepts the teachings of Nanak. They espoused a very inclusive definition of a Sikh; they accepted the divisions in the Sikh *panth*, and recognized and legitimated different groups. Their most significant caveat was the condemnation of marriage outside the *panth*.

The Lahore chapter, closely aligned with the Tat Khalsa early on, emphasized the primacy of Amritdhari Sikhs (initiated members of the Khalsa). This is central to the concern, shared by the Tat Khalsa, that the Sikh religion was in danger of extinction. The Khalsa Sikhs of the Lahore chapter reacted more vehemently to the danger of marriage outside the *panth*. They attacked the institution of caste, the claim of the existence of living gurus beyond the original ten, the reverence for *pirs*, *sants* and descendents of Nanak, as well as the worship of idols in any form. The Tat Khalsa viewed these customs as accretions to the Sikhism handed down by the gurus. Corruptions in the faith needed to be eradicated; in their view this was the goal of the Singh Sabha.

Such differences were reflected in the methodologies of each chapter as well. Both branches of the Singh Sabha utilized the new print culture, though not to the same degree, and held meetings to debate and propagate their conception of Sikh identity. There were, however, significant differences in the extent to which these methods were employed. The Amritsar branch became well-known for developing a publicity network that badgered opponents with legal cases and social ostracism (Barrier 1998, 38). In maintaining control of shrines, albeit only with support from the government, they succeeded in staving off the attempts of the Khalsa Sikhs to remove all images.

The Lahore Sabha made much greater strides in all forms of education. Less than a year after the founding of the Lahore Sabha, Gurmukh Singh established the *Gurmukhi Akhbar*, a weekly paper in Punjabi. Within another year he started the *Vidyarak*, a monthly journal. In 1883 Gurmukh Singh opened the Khalsa press with the purchase of a printing press. He also added two more papers to its repertoire, the *Khalsa Gazette* in 1884, and the *Khalsa Akhbar* in 1886. This is but one example of how the Lahore Sabha took advantage of print culture.

Ditt Singh, whom Oberoi describes as “author, publisher, journalist, public speaker, preacher, consultant, teacher, and polemicist par excellence”

(Oberoi 1994, 289), led the Lahore Sabha's use of print media. He wrote more than forty books and many articles for the Lahore Sabha's journals. Jawahir Singh, an early member of the Lahore Singh Sabha, was appointed a fellow of the Anjuman-i-Punjab the year he entered the Sabha. He later became Secretary of the Khalsa College and a fellow of Punjab University. Other Sikh scholars such as Chai Kahn Singh and Chai Vir Singh contributed to "moulding and recording a version of Sikh tradition which remains dominant in intellectual circles to the present day" (McLeod 1989, 72).

These are a few of the personalities that shaped the Lahore Sabha and the activities they initiated. The Lahore Sabha organized an "educational venture" that invigorated education in the Punjab by the creation of the Sikh Education Conference and a network of affiliated schools (Barrier 1998, 39). Additionally, they gave priority to the opening of orphanages and began the training of Sikh specialists such as *granthis* and *ragis* (Barrier 1998, 39). Here we see both institutional and traditional education motivated by concerns for Sikh independence. Barrier characterizes the Tat Khalsa associated Singh Sabha: "In short, this new aggressive Singh Sabha wing responded creatively to the new cultural and political milieu of the Punjab and showed keen understanding of how to utilize the new print media to communicate ideas and shape Sikh opinion" (Barrier 1998, 39).

The discourse of the Lahore Singh Sabha, the "new aggressive Singh Sabha wing," was shaped by the Tat Khalsa. In the preceding section I have discussed the social aspect of the Lahore Singh Sabha and the efforts and results of this perspective. In the following section I will discuss the Tat Khalsa influence on the ideology of Lahore Singh Sabha activities and the efforts and results motivated by this perspective.

TAT KHALSA IDEOLOGY

A member of the Tat Khalsa recognizes himself as a true adherent to Sikhism. This illustrates the polemical nature of the Tat Khalsa movement, and is important to its role in the Singh Sabha movement. In its initial conception it aimed at restoring Sikhism to its previously pure state, to remove the accretions that had crept in from Hinduism. Sanatan Sikhs argue that practices labeled as accretions by Khalsa Sikhs were originally aspects of a rich Sikh identity. One practice that is vehemently condemned by Giani Ditt Singh, one of the foremost thinkers in the Tat Khalsa, is the worship of Muslim Pir Sakhi Sarvar. He asserted that the worship of these holy people undermined the Sikh faith. His polemics against the worship of Muslim *pirs*, pilgrimages, and other Hindu or Muslim activities became the basis for many future attacks by the Khalsa Sikhs on the accretions.

The Tat Khalsa frequently sent office-holding members—such as Ditt Singh, and other polemicists—or even paid missionaries to local festivals in order to teach rural Sikhs the true nature of these activities and to inform them what activities true Sikhs undertake. In the battle to eradicate the Hindu elements of Sikhism it became customary to label any activity that remotely resembled Hinduism as Hindu. Attaching the label “Hinduism” to a practice enabled the Tat Khalsa to identify an unorthodox practice and alert Sikhs to its danger. By doing this, the Tat Khalsa created a conceptual distance between those continuing the unorthodox practice and the Sikh community. They pressured non-Khalsa Sikhs to conform to the Sikh norm. This labeling was also common in the literature of the Sabha.

In addition to polemics against activities seen as Hindu, the Tat Khalsa worked to eradicate the idea that anyone could be raised to a superior religious status over another, especially in the tradition that accords a special place to the descendants of Nanak. The Tat Khalsa emphasized what Oberoi called the “antistructural pole of Sikhism,” which deconstructs the social hierarchies that are seen as oppressive. This was very appealing to the working-class Sikhs. In addition, it proved to be a strong legitimizing force in the Tat Khalsa polemics against Sanatan Sikhs. While this issue remains unresolved, the advantage it gave to the Tat Khalsa in these polemics was significant.

The Tat Khalsa won debates over sacred space in similar fashion. The Tat Khalsa campaigned for the liberation of ritual power from the hands of the ruling-class. With this shift of power from the elite to the individual, the Tat Khalsa gained the support of the masses. By moving control from the ruling to the ruled, and de-emphasizing the place of religious intermediaries in the Sikh religion, the Tat Khalsa took power from the Sanatan Sikhs—who had previously controlled the shrines and temples—and gave it to the previously disenfranchised masses. In doing so, their appeal grew among the working class majority. They granted all Sikhs the right to access their sacred space. Instituting these changes shifted the focus of rural religion from pilgrimage sites and non-Sikh establishments to the *gurdwara*, what Oberoi calls the “Sikh corporate symbol par excellence.” The Tat Khalsa empowered rural Sikhs, albeit with a Khalsa Sikh identity.

Central to these reforms was the Tat Khalsa use of the *Rahit-nama*, a collection of texts that included proscriptions on such matters as dress and behavior. They insisted that only those who followed the injunctions found in the *Rahit-namas* were to be considered Sikhs. The Tat Khalsa did not simply assert the veracity of these claims. They used two types of literature to strengthen this claim and propagate its interpretation of these texts. Tat Khalsa Sikhs wrote in Gurmukhi and distributed free of cost histories of martyrs and historical fiction—particularly tales of Sikh heroes tortured or

killed for the determination to maintain their cultural symbols, symbols anachronistically associated with Khalsa identity. The effect intended is clear—embellishing and creating stories of Sikh martyrs dying at the hands of Muslims for their faith contributed to a profound identification with Khalsa ideology: “Only those who stuck to the glorious heritage of the heroic epoch deserved to be called Sikhs” (Oberoi 1994, 332).

These novels emphasized initiation. This resulted in an increase in the baptism of Sikhs into the Khalsa order. There were two types of baptism; one involved upholding the physical symbols of the Khalsa (the 5 K’s), the other did not. By further limiting the view of the former baptism as a shadow of the full initiation, and the latter as canonical, the Tat Khalsa forced Sikhs to take the Khalsa initiation or risk alienation from Sikhism. Similar efforts by the Tat Khalsa effected changes in other life-cycle rituals (Oberoi 1994, 334-344). Many Sikhs slowly shifted their attitude toward identification of fellow Sikhs, eventually considering the Khalsa Sikh as the model Sikh.

Both social and ideological motivations contributed to the flood of education Sikhs in this period addressed in their struggle with identity. The concepts communicated via these various forms of education contained religious themes and addressed ideologies that affected identity. The contents of the thousands of pamphlets, the contents of the histories written by Khalsa Sikhs in the Lahore Sabha, the themes discussed in roaming missionary groups, and the debates between competing Sabhas all shaped identity. The Tat Khalsa, as a motivating ideology of Singh Sabha thought, motivated a change in Sikh identity. The reform movement centered on Tat Khalsa ideology was widespread and pervasive. The Lahore Sabha made more effective methods of propagating new ideas aimed at purifying Sikhism. This movement had an enormous impact on Sikhs living near the end of the nineteenth century.

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE

Another major influence on Sikh identity, one intimately tied to the Tat Khalsa and the Singh Sabha, was the British army.

There was a deep conviction within the army hierarchy that the martial prowess of the Sikhs flowed mystically out of their religious observances and beliefs. It was feared that if Sikh traditions were not upheld, the ability of Sikh soldiers to act as a ‘fighting machine’ might rapidly deteriorate. (Oberoi 1994, 361)

This stereotype the British officials had of the Sikhs contributed greatly to the association of Khalsa identity with Sikh identity. Oberoi's point is made clear by these examples: in order to engender the Sikhs's fighting skills—thought to be connected with the Khalsa religious identity—the army employed Sikh clerics to conduct religious services, which strictly enforced the maintenance of the external Khalsa symbols. The bravery, loyalty, and scripturalism sought and enforced by the army coincided with the image that Tat Khalsa Sikhs propogated.

It is not surprising that Sikh soldiers became very involved in the Singh Sabha, particularly Sabhas associated with the Tat Khalsa. It was common to have military personnel among members of a Sabha. In 1898 and 1899 Sikh army units founded two Sabha chapters. The support from Sikh soldiers entailed more than membership; a good percentage of subscriptions to the *Khalsa Akhbar* were held by soldiers. In addition, funding of Sabha literature was supported by the middle-ranking Sikh soldiers. The army sanctioned, even encouraged, all of these actions. Soldiers gained status and respect from military service. This image of status and respect was linked to the Khalsa image reinforced by the army. Thus soldiers coming from rural areas returned from the military with psychological capital that was well-spent by the Tat Khalsa.

The government's reinforcement of Khalsa Sikh identity was not limited to the army. Kapur remarks that "preference for Sikhs was not restricted to service in the army. The 1891 census report noted 'the marked preference shown for Sikhs in many branches of Government services'" (Kapur 1986, 25). In addition to the stereotype of the Sikhs as a so-called martial race, there was no shortage of positive stereotypes of Sikhs in colonial India. Later censuses are evidence of this narrow circumscription of Sikh identity. In the 1881 census there was no clear definition of a Sikh, though the Khalsa Sikh was the popular conception at the time (Kapur 1986, 26). In the 1891 census, however, there was a clear definition: "By a true Sikh is meant a member of the Khalsa, a follower of the ordinances of Guru Gobind Singh" (Kapur 1986, 26). The issue of identity had changed by 1911, by which time the definition of religion rested on the declaration of the individual (See Oberoi 1994, 209-214; Kapur 1986, 26-32).

CONCLUSION

My concern in this paper has been to address Sikh efforts to define Sikh identity. The educated aimed these efforts at Sikhs who listened to the debates between Sabhas, were visited by missionaries (often from many different schools of thought), relied for success in the westernized Punjab, and

went to the military or the government for their livelihood. These Sikhs experienced an identity crisis, and they had an impact on the formation of Sikh identity. While institutional education influenced the development of the leadership of the Singh Sabha it is clear that less institutional educational techniques—which were employed more successfully by the Tat Khalsa—played a pivotal role in the acceptance of the Khalsa Sikh identity by the majority of the Sikh *panth*. Intellectuals and upper-caste Sikhs, the aristocracy, and the religious elite stood at the center of the turmoil over religious identity, but the question of religious identity weighed on the minds of the majority of Sikhs.

In the beginning of the colonial period there was little concern over diversity in the Sikh *panth*. Religious identity became a major concern of many Sikhs in colonial India. Christian missionaries changed the atmosphere of religious life. While diversity was a facet of Indian religious life, so was the motivation to create a uniform identity for Sikhism. When Christian missionary activity became unrestricted, concern grew among Indians. Hindus reacted first. The Arya Samaj and other similar organizations took the offensive against Christian and Muslim missionary work. By instituting *shuddhi*, a practice of conversion to Hinduism, Hindu organizations created their own conversion movements. In this environment of conversion and re-conversion, a desire grew to ensure that the Sikh identity survived. To avoid “absorption” of Sikhism into Hinduism (an idea not completely opposed within the Sikh *panth*), many Sikhs felt that the notion of Sikh identity must be uniform. The motivation to create a norm of Sikh identity became paramount for a few highly motivated Sikhs.

The conversion of four Sikh youths instigated the formation of the Singh Sabha. Clearly this event was the culmination of tensions that had been building in the sub-continent. Sikhs motivated to define Sikhism and defend their religion soon divided themselves along social and doctrinal ideals. The Amritsar Singh Sabha and the Lahore Singh Sabha became the geographical and ideological loci of the Sikh struggle for identity. This dual notion of Sikh identity has not been resolved and continues today.

The common misconception that all Sikhs are Khalsa Sikhs or that Khalsa Sikhs represent all Sikhs was not an accident of history. Sikhs within the Lahore Singh Sabha worked tirelessly toward this goal. Early in the struggle for identity they dominated the publication of Sikh histories, which advanced a Khalsa interpretation of history. The creative use of pamphlets in a propaganda war played an integral part in the spread of Tat Khalsa ideology. Reference to *Rahit-nama* literature, particularly with a Tat Khalsa understanding, led to the slow acceptance of Khalsa ideals of behavior and dress. Historical fiction—laden with religious nationalism associated with

Khalsa figures defending Khalsa notions and Khalsa symbols of Sikhhood—inculcated in many Sikhs the Khalsa notion of identity. The use of Khalsa missionaries, open forum meetings, and other means of proselytizing all contributed to the acceptance of Khalsa notions of Sikh identity. These efforts fall under a broad definition of education. Sikhs who were associated with the Amritsar Singh Sabha, largely Sanatan Sikhs, failed to take advantage of the new print culture and failed to match the creative efforts of the Tat Khalsa. This resulted in the ascendancy of the Khalsa Sikh identity.

The Tat Khalsa also appropriated the Western conception of education. Most members of the Lahore Singh Sabha were educated in the educational setting of the late nineteenth century. Recognizing the advantage of this education, they supported the growth of such institutions. The Anjuman helped groom future Lahore Sabha members and they in turn helped groom the Anjuman into a full-fledged college. The foundation and maintenance of the Khalsa College is a prime example of the Tat Khalsa's push to establish exclusively Punjabi run educational institutions with a liberal dose of Khalsa ideology in the curriculum. The Tat Khalsa utilized formal and informal educational methods to impress upon Sikhs of the late nineteenth century the importance of a uniform Sikh identity. The army specifically, and the government generally, validated Tat Khalsa identity. The support provided by the government was not sufficient to account for the ascendancy of the Khalsa identity by itself, but it was instrumental nonetheless. Tat Khalsa Sikhs were highly motivated and valued many forms of education, which they used widely and creatively. The notion of Sikh identity that they disseminated in the push for uniformity was that of the Khalsa Sikh.

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Bollywood, Beauty, and the Corporate Construction of “International Standards” in Post-Liberalization Bombay

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Anthropologists have long documented the way in which economic changes are also social changes; ethnographic accounts of the temporal-spatial compression brought by what is commonly referred to as “globalization” are inescapable (Held 1999). Globalization affects all facets of life—from sexuality (Liechty 2001; Nagel 2003), to marriage patterns (Kendall 1996), to the types of commodities that are accorded status (Appadurai 1986). It is impossible to isolate notions of consumption from notions of selfhood and identity, as the two are engaged in complex dialogical processes.

In his discussion of middle-class consumers in Kathmandu, Mark Liechty calls this process “an always shifting game of public consumption” (2003, 62). The vast array of media images and opportunities for self expression that economic liberalization brought with it to South Bombay underscore that what it means to be fashionable, or a part of a certain social group, is constantly changing—at least in the sense that these are open to negotiation by individual choices which, in turn, are informed by global media flows. Yet, interestingly, the changes these may prompt are often as much behavioral as they are consumption-based.

One of the most profound changes that took place following Gorbachev’s glasnost, which loosened state controls over the Russian media, was the explosion of sexual images that quickly began to serve as symbols of all that was opposed to the regimented austerity of Soviet life (Gessen 1995, 198). What seems to be at work in this case, as in South Bombay, is the focus on the individual and on individual pleasure, as inherently liberating.

In this vein, studies of advertising have documented how the production of identity and the consumption of commodities in capitalist societies are often directly related, if not by-products of one another. Burke’s (1996) analysis of the conflation of modernity with the consumption of certain brands of soap, as well as Kemper’s (2001) discussion of how, in the case of Sri Lanka, “for all its complexity and power, the world system exerts its claims only to the extent that it touches people living lives of local design” (16), both

serve to illustrate that while certain commodities may be crucial to the molding of identity, such commodities must also be locally relevant.

If these studies have revealed anything, it is that concepts such as “tradition” are neither static nor monolithic; they are always negotiated by class, gender, and the affiliations that one chooses, or has chosen for him or her. “Identity” is not a zero-sum equation in which one cultural type surpasses another at any given point in time; on the contrary, in South Bombay individuals are many different things at once, and see no inherent contradiction in being so. As such, I choose to describe the process of presenting oneself as a social being with particular tastes and affectations as a molding of identity, a never-ending contextual process which is enacted as part of a daily process through which individuals position themselves, and others, in the world.

In South Bombay, this positioning relies largely upon the notion of “standards,” a synecdoche for ways of living and being that are urban and largely European and American in character, and often referred to as Western. The word “Western” is a signifier for a complex of behaviors and beliefs revolving around individual choice and independence that is associated with a place geographically marked as “the West.” These behaviors and beliefs include: marrying the partner of one’s choice, a (superficial) sense of male-female equality, English medium education, an interest in fashion, and accepting a lifestyle that (superficially) espouses the right to individual choice and pleasure.

As this paper will illustrate, the perception is common that such imported standards are far superior to more Bombay-based ones. Liberalization served as such a totalizing force in South Bombay that it is impossible to document the changes it caused as a whole; instead, the next three sections explore sites in which its effects were extremely profound for individuals—namely, the beauty industry, Bollywood, and changing ideas about the body and fitness.

DEFINING BEAUTY: SETTING THE STANDARDS

Urban India has experienced a revolution in commercial beauty products and beauty culture since liberalization in 1991. Prior to liberalization, women had two brands of lipstick and cold cream to choose from. In the last five years, however, *zaibatsu* giant Hindustan Lever Limited released 250 new beauty products, and international corporations have also subsequently been heavily involved in marketing beauty products in India. French cosmetics giant L’Oreal, for example, has spent over thirty million dollars on local manufacturing since 1994. As Lever’s Dalip Sahgal says, “the Indian woman no longer compares herself to other Indians—she uses international concepts

of beauty” (Kripalani 1999). Fragrances form a sizeable portion of the market for beauty products in urban India, all of which are grouped under three marketing heads: Kalinga Cosmetics, Euro Traditions, and House of Baccarose. During an interview S. Jayabalan, managing director of Kalinga Cosmetics, which handles international brands such as Kenzo, stressed the importance of international trends in Indian consumption.

Indians are very brand conscious. They are well aware of all the popular brands abroad like Issey Miyake and Lancome. What’s popular abroad is very popular here too, the reason for this being that the world is a much smaller place today; so people pick up trends in the course of their travel. Another reason is that everything’s available here on a wider scale than before.

By choosing to only address the increased availability of products and the exposure individuals receive via international travel, Jayabalan ignores the way in which fashion magazines and marketing houses have created a need for fragrances where none existed before.

Femina magazine was quick to capitalize on the rapidly expanding beauty culture with the publication of numerous fragrance and beauty books. In addition to these, *Femina* features magazine inserts every few months with titles like “Skin” and “Scent.” In these inserts, which number about twenty graphic and color rich pages, editor Amy Fernandes tries to educate readers. In a sample issue, elaborate distinctions were made between scents, and readers were taught the difference between a woody top-note and a fruity heart-note. The issue included dozens of detailed descriptions of expensive fragrances. Issey Miyake’s L’eau D’issey, for example, was described as

subtle and elegant. It clings to the skin like an article of clothing and comes to life on the woman who wears it. A contemporary classic which evokes purity and transparency. (February 2001)

The use of such ethereal language to describe fragrance was complicated by a sophisticated analysis advising which Christian Dior lotions work best with various skin types. Notably, the back of the magazine carried a price list, and I was quick to note that a bottle of L’eau D’issey cost about as much as my fellow subeditors at *Femina* earned in a month.

Nevertheless, the marketing at work behind the beauty industry is fierce and well-planned. Passages such as the following, taken from an editor’s note to “Skin,” appeal to women and play on femininity and nationalism:

An important aspect that Indian women just cannot choose to ignore today is the overwhelming number of beauties our country is throwing up at international pageants. Aishwarya Rai, Sushmita Sen, Diana Hayden, Lara Dutta, Priyanka Chopra, Diya Mirza—they're world players on an international stage. Couple that with the superpower India is poised to become. Triple that with the steadily growing liberal economy and foreign brands arriving at our shores. Can you as a modern woman afford to be left out of it all? (February 2001)

This passage positions the reader in a difficult place: although the products featured in the magazine are expensive, the editor makes direct associations between international fame, India's national image, and female beauty. Of course, women are independent agents who negotiate messages on a daily basis far more complex than this; nonetheless, the direct link between beauty products and being "left out of it all" is disturbing.

Interestingly, this near-obsession with commercial beauty products is not restricted to elite English language magazines. The Hindi language *Meri Saheli* (My Girlfriend) routinely features beauty advice that increasingly relies on the use of commercial beauty products, rather than homemade ones. The October 2002 issue advised:

Aagar bal domuhe ho gaye ho aur bal ko trim karne ka samay na ho to hair shine Serum lagaa le. Isse domuhe bal chip jayenge.
(If you have split ends and do not have time for a trim, apply hair shine serum. This will hide your split ends.)

I was initially struck by the recommendation for the use of shine serum, rather than the readily available coconut oil, because shine serum is a comparatively expensive product that is most likely unfamiliar to the solidly middle-class target readership of *Meri Saheli*. Its presence, however, underscores how commercial beauty culture has penetrated everyday life in urban India, regardless of class.

One beauty product that has achieved remarkable success in India across class and ethnic groups is the bleaching cream Fair and Lovely. Something of an institution in India, Fair and Lovely was patented by Hindustan Lever Limited in 1971 following the patenting of niacinamide, a chemical that lightens skin color. First test marketed in the south in 1975, it was available throughout India by 1978, and subsequently became the best selling skin cream in India. Accounting for eighty percent of the fairness cream market in India, Fair and Lovely has an estimated sixty million consumers throughout

the subcontinent, and exports to thirty-four countries in Southeast and Central Asia, as well as the Middle East. In 2000, Fair and Lovely embarked on a new marketing approach, with newer, more sophisticated packaging and improved fragrance (Hindustan Lever prospectus, 2002). Even an institution like Fair and Lovely, it seemed, was not immune to the beauty product revolution.

A major hurdle for marketing experts selling cosmetics to urban Indian women was the fact that makeup is still highly sexualized in South Asia. A Hindustan Lever description of the new Jellip brand of lip color directly addressed this problem:

Today's young teenagers can watch out for an exciting and trendy alternative to lipsticks by giving them the option of giving their lips a subtle hint of color and at the same time softly moisturizing them. The hip and cool Elle 18 Jellip, available in trendy shades, can easily be slipped into a teenager's bag and can form a part of regular college wear. No more will the young and spirited teenager have to worry about parental disapproval when she wears lip color—because she will not be wearing lipstick, she will be wearing Jellip! So young girls can go ahead and wear Jellip everyday and sport really cool lip colors! (ibid.)

By providing a way for teenaged girls to negotiate parental concerns over the use of makeup, Jellip is a uniquely post-liberalization cosmetic. After all, having enough youth spending power to market a product exclusively to young women is still a relatively new phenomenon.

Perhaps hoping to capitalize on this social trend, French hair stylists at a L'Oreal hair show I attended in Bombay were insistent that the stylists in the audience learn how to “become fashion translators, not fashion victims.” As the press release for the event lauded, the event hoped to “not only give a window to trends overseas but also allow hairdressers here to blend international styling trends and techniques with local preferences and thus retain their individuality.”

This notion of “translation” speaks to a distinction between private senses of self, which, following McGrath, “include the same events and changing relationships that are then experienced through cultural rules,” and the more public presentation of that private self, which is the negotiation of that experience (2000, 35). Ideas about beauty, at both corporate and individual levels, provide excellent sites for the examination of this, as the physical self is the literal embodiment of the interaction between the two.

This concept of the translation of fashion is the ultimate example of what beauty means in post-liberalization urban India. Just as individuals who are

not professionally beautiful seek to replicate international trends on their own bodies, likewise those who are prominent in the Hindi film industry seek to reproduce standards in their own work.

SETTING STANDARDS ONSTAGE: BOLLYWOOD

With earlier films, there was no competition. You had to go to see a movie! Today, you have a choice; you can sit at home and watch television; your need for entertainment gets fulfilled when you go home and switch on the television. You are not hungry for entertainment; but earlier, it was either read a book, or see a film. That was the only source of entertainment. So today, you do insist on quality, because basically you have a choice.

As Govind Swaroop, the Film Minister for Maharashtra state, observes in the passage above—without naming liberalization as the reason for increased choices in entertainment—competition has grown exponentially in the industry. Liberalization, with its attendant media onslaught, has meant that standards have been raised in Hindi cinema. The setting of standards, whether via the corporatization of production houses or the recognition of Hindi films in the United States or Europe, is an integral part of the post-liberalization media world. Because setting standards is primarily about referencing trends in the United States and Europe, it follows that the standards that are discursively constructed as worth following are international and global.

I spent six months working for Pritish Nandy Communications (PNC), a major film production house and a publicly traded company. The latter is still fairly unusual for a production house, but was of interest to me—it was always fascinating to watch Hindi film producers and directors, notorious for their utter lack of reliability and disrespect for deadlines, be held accountable to shareholders. During the time I spent with the company, I helped, in an extremely marginal capacity, to author an accounting plan that was poised to revolutionize how the industry did business. Not surprisingly, this revolution was primarily centered in a project of referencing, as the following passage from the accounting plan illustrates:

The idea is to create a mode accounting policy that will be universally acceptable, be an intrinsic part of global valuation systems, and meet the specific requirements of the Indian entertainment scenario. It is also the intention to have a model that is acceptable to global investors, fund managers and international bankers so that PNC is seen to be a company that

follows international practices when it comes to accounting policy and valuation.

This list of goals aims for the privatization of the film industry and the elimination of criminal elements, who are well-known sources of financial support for films. Noting that “the subject of accounting for cinematic and television content in India is at its fledgling stage,” the company tacitly acknowledges the widespread practice of involving dubious sources of finance in order to fund a film’s various production stages (PNC accounting plan, 2002). Because the Hindi film industry is, by its very nature, an uncertain business at best, it has traditionally been difficult to secure funding to make a film. One way to circumvent this problem is to use financing from organized crime; money is laundered for organized crime while funding is provided for the film.

Stories abound about Bollywood’s criminal connections. Socialite and romance novelist Shobhaa De first rose to fame after authoring her first novel, *Starry Nights*, which documented (in sensationalized fiction form), the intimate relationship between the film industry and an international crime syndicate that operates from Bombay to Dubai. Although those in the industry never deny outright that most of the funding for films comes from crime syndicates, most are quick to point out that it is the high profile nature of the film industry that draws attention to its illegal activities.

It’s human nature to talk like that. If I say, “Yesterday I went for a walk and saw a beautiful sunset,” and then I say, “Yesterday I went for a walk and I saw someone shoot someone,” you’re going to say, “Wow,” to the second one. But the industry is getting clean now, after Bharat Shah and all, and at the same time it’s going corporate; so the money’s there now.

Director Pankaj Parashar uses the example of Bharat Shah, an infamous Bombay diamond merchant and film producer who, at the time of writing, has spent over one year in prison without bail waiting for a trial. Accused of using funding from the Chhota Rajan crime syndicate to finance films, Shah’s has proved a landmark case. Although I often heard individuals in the industry comment that Bharat Shah was being unfairly singled out for something that everyone did, there were no rallying cries from the industry in support of his innocence.

Film financing is largely based on trust and undeclared taxable income, known as “black money,” and the industry is characterized by its absolute lack of contracts. In an effort to circumvent this, in the early 1990s producer

Subhash Ghai tried unsuccessfully to get the Government of India to consider film an industry, in order to get bank funding and insurance. Partly as a result of the government's refusal, in the industry the easiest source of funding for films is also the most dubious one. Yet publicly held production houses, such as the one that I worked for, circumvent this by being open to investment. With the help of public investment, a ready supply of cash is always available to make the three or four films required of the average Hindi film production house each year.

This change in financing and accounting policy is based on the assumption that standards need to be in place. By outlaying the typical Hindi film's budget (an average of fifty million rupees) in business plan format, PNC seeks to standardize the process by which films' expenses are both declared and acquired. A typical Hindi film, for example, sets fixed costs at five percent, personnel costs at one percent, advertisement and publicity at six percent, artist remuneration at eleven percent, technician's expenses at twenty percent, and production expenses at fifty-seven percent (PNC accounting plan, 2002). Standardizing these costs, with room for variance from film to film, helps to alleviate the more dubious accounting problems that many production houses face.

Setting standards also involves envisioning a mode of economic difference, one that has profoundly changed from pre-liberalization India's vision of economics. PNC makes reference to this old Nehruvian mode of economic thinking, which is well-known for its focus on making India self-sufficient with such projects as dams and factories, noting that "entertainment, not steel, not autos, not cements, not even telecom, will lead the new economy" (ibid.). This acknowledgement regarding the change that India has experienced in economic thinking points to how liberalization is inextricably linked to setting standards in the industry.

Viewing cinema as a business along similar to a corporation is a new way of thinking in the Hindi film industry; this fact sometimes leads to interesting analogies. Consider, for example, PNC's argument regarding a film's higher potential for earning power in comparison to detergent:

Unlike the detergent, which can be exploited by the producer and enjoyed by the viewer only once, a movie can be exploited by the producer and enjoyed by the viewer over and over again. You can release a movie in a theater, release it on video, cut a sound-track album, sell satellite rights, show it on Doordarshan, play it on local and overseas cables, merchandise it by selling t-shirts, apparel and related products, novelize it and make it the theme of a string of restaurants, market it on the internet, when

real time video hits the medium and years later, it can be shown to a nostalgic audience. (ibid.)

By characterizing film as a product that can be exploited multiple times as a means to attract international investors, PNC attempts to create a viable plan for the expansion of the Hindi film industry via legitimate means. Curbing piracy is also important in this endeavour; the accounting plan is quick to note that India is “joining the other countries of the world via the recognition and protection of intellectual property rights” (ibid.).

Not surprisingly, the notion of setting standards in the industry relies heavily upon making reference to ideas from the United States and Europe:

In the USA, which is one of the world’s largest centers of the entertainment industry and cinema, the accounting profession has developed unique accounting guidelines dealing with standards for the motion picture industry, entitled FASB 53 (Financial Accounting Standards Bulletin). (ibid.)

As the Hindi film industry refers to this outline, the main advantages to the industry are that the license fees to each movie are known, the cost of each movie can be reasonably determined, the collection of the full contract is reasonably assured, and the licensee has accepted the movie in accordance with the conditions of the license agreement (ibid.).

By referencing and employing the American FASB standard, all the costs of a film are made as clear as is reasonably possible from the outset, ensuring the declaration of all costs and profits generated by a film. If followed correctly, the FASB standard, as employed in its Bombay *avatar*, allows no room for money laundering. This, in turn, further encourages investment and makes the production house’s ventures more lucrative and less risky.

As part of a plan to bring in international investors, PNC lists the recent trends and advances that the industry has made—the expansion and upgrading of exhibition infrastructure, the expansion and upgrading of theater infrastructure in the form of multiplexes and audiovisual effects, curbs on piracy, increased amounts of exports of cinematic content, satellite rights, increased demand for film music rights, increased corporate sponsorship and merchandising, as well as emerging sources of content delivery, such as broadband connections. All these are examples of a privatized company’s most nascent efforts to move beyond the old stereotypes of a Hindi film industry riddled with financial ties to organized crime.

Hindi films have long made reference to the United States and Europe, most notably in the form of films set in non-South Asian locations,

particularly Switzerland. Even the word “Bollywood,” as the Hindi film industry is known, makes reference to American “Hollywood.” Nonetheless, producer Mahesh Bhatt noted that Switzerland was but a poor substitute for the beauty of Kashmir and other Indian locations. For his film *Raaz*, Mahesh shot in Switzerland, yet the plot of the film was set in Ooty:

I’ve shot Switzerland as if it’s a part of Ooty. Switzerland’s a beautiful place, but Kashmir is much, much more beautiful, God’s paradise on earth. But because of the insurgency, Switzerland is the other option, now that we can’t go to Kashmir anymore.

As such, we can envision Hindi films as multiply centered, as part of a world in which Swiss meadows can stand in for Indian ones without contradiction. Even films with plots set in India often have dance sequences filmed in international locations, most often in Europe, to provide an international flavor without disrupting plot continuity.

Yet 2002’s nomination of the Hindi film *Lagaan* (Land Tax) to the Oscars in Hollywood provided an interesting point of contention that underscored Hindi cinema’s need to be validated by the ultimate authority of Hollywood. Hindi cinema occupies a strange position in the world as it struggles to remain the most prolific film industry in the world, while moving away from its reputation of being lax regarding continuity, unoriginal plots, and copyright infringement.

Despite the industry’s reputation, however, the film *Lagaan* provoked a sensation in 2002 when it was nominated for an Oscar. A constant topic of conversation both in and outside the film industry, the nomination seemed to prove to some people that the Hindi film industry and, by extension, India had arrived on a global level. The excitement surrounding *Lagaan* crossed over into the realm of absolute obsession just before the Oscars, and the film’s production team was honored in numerous ways. All the film awards shows I attended held a moment of silence in the middle of the distribution of awards for the audience to pray for *Lagaan* to do well at the Oscars. Bombay’s most popular nightclub, Mykonos, held a “*Lagaan* Night” the night before the Oscars, and had all the guests write their wishes for the film’s success on a huge roll of paper which was faxed to star Aamir Khan’s hotel room in Los Angeles. The furvor died out, however, when *Lagaan* did not receive an Oscar. The following day, the *Bombay Times* featured a half page photograph of a weeping Aamir Khan the next day, with a caption that sobbed with unfulfilled expectations: “How Could it Not Win?”

It was as if the hopes of the nation were pinned on one film, a fact which did not go unnoticed by some who voiced their contention to me privately. As Elton Menezes, a personal trainer at the gym and spa Moksh, and I sat through yet another moment of silence for *Lagaan* at a film awards show, he noted:

It's all bullshit, this bowing down before Hollywood stuff. They made the movie for an Indian audience, and they loved it. What more do they want? What can Americans understand about this movie? And why is their award so important? Indians are such suckers—I hate this attitude. Elton's contention that Indians are "such suckers" points perhaps to a case of referencing gone too far; in fact, discussions about *Lagaan* as a cultural phenomenon often dealt exclusively with the recognition of Hindi films in Europe and the United States.

Those more directly involved in the film industry were often quick to make veiled references to *Lagaan* during the course of interviews I conducted at the height of the enthusiasm surrounding the film. Producer Mahesh Bhatt, when asked for which audience his most recent film was made, noted, "I'm not catering to the tastebuds of any foreign audience. I'm making basically an Indian movie, for the people which are there in my own country." Mahesh's implication that certain films, such as *Lagaan*, are made for a foreign audience is a patriotic reaffirmation of his own film making goals; however, there are no Hindi film directors that would profess to make films for audiences outside of India.

Director Tanuja Chandra, when asked what made a film successful, insisted, "I think that Indians are still unfortunately colonized in a way—they're all the time trying to be Western. This has changed a little bit, but they still feel inferior." Tanuja's linking India's colonial history with the causes for a Hindi film's success points to part of the reason for the excitement surrounding *Lagaan*'s Oscar nomination. Although the film industry, and urban India, sought validation in the form of an Oscar victory for *Lagaan*, the use of references is generally more subtle than the slavish attention that the film's nomination received.

Beyond the corporate conception of American and European standards as ideal, such references are also made on an individual level. As the following section will illustrate, media images are often discursively constructed to create ideals that individuals seek to embody in order to demonstrate their affinity for post-liberalization India's new standards.

GLOBALIZATION AT THE GYM: MEDIA

During my research at Moksh, South Bombay's most exclusive gym and spa, almost everyone I spoke with mentioned that media is a powerful influence for what they consider a beautiful body. As Elton, a personal trainer at Moksh, stated:

There's been a certain awakening, actually, due to the international exposure on television. And we're seeing beautiful people most of the time. It's really picked up in the last five or six years. The reason being that most of the models we look up to, most of the actresses we look up to, have started developing a good body. And since most of us put ourselves in their [the actor's] shoes when we go to watch a movie, we think, "Hey, why can't we woo women with the same body?"

Elton situates the construction of a cosmopolitan body at the confluence of what are usually considered two very different medias: international satellite television and Hindi films. When he mentions that actresses "have started developing a good body," he is referring to actresses in the Hindi film industry who, following what are perceived as international trends, have metamorphosized into thinner, more model-like versions of their former selves. Elton also positions himself as a consumer of films, one who sits in the audience and asks himself why he should not have access to women with the same kind of body that he sees on the screen.

Even the definition of a beautiful body has changed in films, as Rahul, a personal trainer at Moksh, explains:

Yes, it's changing. For the men, I wouldn't say it's changing so much. It used to be Dharmendra and now it's Salman . . . A woman—well, for a woman, Sridevi just doesn't cut it anymore. The look now is more Aishwarya, svelte, fitter. So that's changed, and definitely for the better . . . I think it's appreciated from a general population point of view. Even the grandstanders sitting watching a film, I think, appreciate it. Like the educated lot understand a perfect body, but even a villager can look at a person and say, "woh moti hai" [she is fat].

As Rahul points out, all individuals are capable of appreciating the cosmopolitan body on-screen. His assertion that "even a villager" can find beauty in former Miss World Aishwarya Rai's thin body, as compared to the

more voluptuous actress Sridevi, points to a similarity in conceptions of beauty that cross class boundaries—all class groups can equally consume the cosmopolitan body on-screen.

It is important to note that the act of viewing the body is also an act of consumption, especially in its media form. This media association also extends to the world of fashion, as Anita Kapoor, wife of 1980s action hero Anil Kapoor and owner of Idea, another elite gym in Bombay, notes:

I don't know much about the rest of India, but, yes, I would say people are more body conscious in Bombay, because Bombay people are more well-traveled. I think they're more aware . . . And because they see clothes—because, Bombay is like the fashion capital of India. So there are all these models and there are all these shows, and people identify with them. We were in clothes before I started here, and what I noticed was that everyone who comes to fashion shows identifies with the models, and they think they can look like that, or be like that, or be like that. That's why we have shows! Because you can believe that you'll look as beautiful in those clothes. I mean, you can look beautiful, but not that beautiful.

Anita links the audience's identification of the model's body on the catwalk with the increased frequency of foreign travel in Bombay. This points to an interesting connection between globalization and changing standards of physical perfection. Anita also characterizes the model's body as an unreachable ideal that almost deceives the audience into thinking that they can look “that beautiful” in the clothes the models are wearing, thus encouraging them to clothe themselves the same way in the hope that their bodies will look the same.

Like Elton's association of Bombay with the entertainment industry, Anita's identification with Bombay as the fashion capital of India points to how, combined with foreign travel and the awareness that Anita mentions, individuals are positioned as uniquely able and eager to sculpt their bodies into a cosmopolitan form. This sort of causality was pointed out to me again and again by individuals in the fitness industry in Bombay. As Moksh manager Sahil Jaffrey notes:

You know, we call it MTV culture. Ever since satellite channels have come into our homes, we want to be like that, we want to dress like that. And fitness has become very important because everyone wants to wear tight jeans and short skirts and look

good. Basically, people in Bombay are working out and making their money so they can go out at night and party, and go out in style, in the best labels.

Sahil's association of media in the form of "MTV culture" with a body that wears "tight jeans and short skirts," further illustrates how individuals seek to alter their bodies to resemble media icons. Participating in "MTV culture," at least ideally, requires a certain type of body, a "modern" body that is active, highly mobile, and above all, beautiful.

The construction of this active body is most visible in the diet industry in Bombay: the active body is above all a thin body, one that is uniquely able to take full advantage of life. This image was almost always described to me as being media-inspired. As Anjali Mukherjee, socialite and founder of the weight loss chain that bears her name, said to me, "media is the carrot—it can show you how to look, but not how to look like that." Mukherjee's description of media as an inspiration for the cosmopolitan body points to a link between media and its consumption. In altering their bodies to resemble those depicted in the media, individuals clearly affirm the important role that media and its associated images play in post-liberalization Bombay. Inevitably, this was described to me as the result of a process of becoming aware.

The use of the term "awareness" refers to the diverse set of processes at work which constructs certain experiences and objects as international and cosmopolitan. The following passage, taken from an interview with Sapna Kurup, a clinician at VLCC, a chain of weight loss centers across India, illustrates this.

I think that this change towards a slim body is because of exposure to the global media. The media today says that looking slim is beautiful. The physical consciousness of the people is developing because of the media. People are becoming more aware.

Kurup's unambiguous link between the media and the development of people's awareness of beautiful bodies as slim bodies underscores the power of the media to develop images of beauty. However, because individuals are free agents, it is essential to examine the reason individuals choose to inscribe the bodies that are discursively constructed as beautiful in Bombay—namely, social acceptance.

Shaping a cosmopolitan body is often constructed as essential to social acceptance in post-liberalization Bombay, as Shilpa, a personal trainer, notes:

The exposure of cable TV introduced everyone to a whole new, so to speak, American way of life, because most of the fitness programs coming on TV are generally American. So then you had the magazines coming, and the media, and they played a very important role. Suddenly people were traveling a lot, and they wanted to just wear all kinds of clothes and just look very, very good. There's that whole image—you look good, you smell good, you wear good clothes, you get accepted into the so-called social circle. So the supply is there for the demand—right now everyone wants to look good, wants to look like a model, like some kind of magazine copy or something.

Shilpa's association of social acceptance with looking like "some kind of magazine copy" points to the changing standards of beauty which have accompanied the arrival of economic liberalization and satellite television in India. In the above quote, Shilpa describes the post-liberalization inundation of Bombay with international media images of a so-called beautiful body.

A strong identification with global media was expressed by almost every individual I spoke with during the course of my fieldwork, mostly by the word of "awareness." The use of the word "aware" to describe the change in the way individuals think about life was very common, as gym owner Anita Kapoor asserts:

It's an overall awareness. Now people travel that much more—I mean, we go on five or six vacations a year. Before we didn't do that, just get on a plane and go. But now you see it on TV and you go there—so there's that much more. Now there's so much information, and when you have all that information, you're going to be that much more aware of your body and fitness and that much more in general.

Being aware is synonymous with being conscious of international trends in terms of the body, fashion, and lifestyle.

This awareness is most often visible in Bombay in the high degree of prestige granted to what can be deemed the foreign authority. The *Times of India*, the most widely circulated newspaper in Bombay, regularly featured quarter page advertisements for speaking engagements that various speakers from the United States and Europe, particularly in the field of business, held in Bombay. Although these individuals are rarely authorities in their home countries, their symbolic capital as foreigners brings a high degree of prestige to their names.

The idea of “the foreign,” which refers to the terms “American” and “European,” is granted symbolic capital primarily because of the rapid inundation of international publications and media that Bombay experienced after economic liberalization in 1991. The inception of satellite broadcast networks such as Star TV irrevocably altered what it meant for individuals to be “Indian” and further problematized issues of national boundaries. Although Bombay, as the business capital of India, has always, to some degree, been an international city, it was economic liberalization and the subsequent tide of international media that brought cosmopolitan lifestyles to the fore of the city’s popular culture.

In terms of the body, the admiration of American and other dominant global trends takes multiple forms. One of these is Reebok’s certification course in aerobics, which lasts four months and includes exams conducted by trainers from South Africa and Australia. Exert, an elite gym in Bombay, advertises its facilities by capitalizing on the foreign authority of its exercise equipment, noting that its spinning classes (group-oriented exercise bicycle sessions), are conducted on Schwinn cycles, “in use for the first time in India” (Exert brochure).

Similarly, Idea promotes its aerobics studio as “Reebok-affiliated” (Idea brochure), while Moksh advertises its Galileo exercise equipment as “the best in the world” and “world class” (Moksh brochure). Many gyms choose to publicize their association with international spa and fitness associations to increase their memberships. When I worked for Moksh, one of my most frequent assignments was to find international spa companies Moksh could affiliate itself with.

Yet, during one session at Moksh when I was working with Elton to construct a publicity project, he rolled his eyes when he read the old brochure (which neither of us had written), which described Moksh as situated “opposite the American Consulate.” Elton strongly protested against the inclusion of this blurb, angrily asking, “What, is that why we bought this building? Is that all we’re fucking doing here? We’re not in America; we have our own fitness thing going on here.” Elton’s rejection of what he perceived to be an unnecessary (and almost neo-colonial) reference to the United States certainly helped to destabilize a paradigm that I viewed as securely in place.

The membership of those who are discursively constructed as international is also important. Rahul, a trainer at Moksh, described his clientele as “extremely well-traveled, well-read, who know about the gyms abroad.” “The foreign” is often credited with starting an educative process that changed the way in which individuals viewed the cosmopolitan body, as Moksh manager Mohua Sen notes:

When you have people getting in your face twenty-four hours a day, really gorgeous looking people, it is but natural that people start thinking that this is the right way, the ideal way, to look . . . Years ago, people—it didn't really matter to people if they put on weight or whatever. It was not as much of an all-encompassing issue as it is now. You took it for granted, like, "OK, now I'm married, I'm gonna have babies," and nobody ever even tried to control it.

Mohua clearly states that media challenged the way that people, particularly women, thought about their bodies. Media is also a scapegoat for the negative perceptions of certain types of bodies, as when women refer to the "anorexic Kate Moss look." The influence of media and its potential to confuse with its multitude of messages is not lost on individuals, who mold their own identities via referencing the desirable, as it is viewed in media images, and enacting the attainable, as it is realizable in everyday life.

Indeed, the molding of identity is always done vis-à-vis others, through a project of positioning that may take place at an individual or global level. Members of Bombay's media elite position themselves as similar to their counterparts in Europe and the United States, whether in terms of making reference to Hollywood or beauty culture in New York City. This is part of an imagined community in which what one has and what one does is crucial to the construction of who one is.

One interesting example of this involved Naina Shah, a woman whose life story I covered while working for *Femina* magazine. The owner of a high-priced boutique, Naina had contacted the magazine in order to tell her story and, as a result, receive a great deal of publicity for her boutique. Her story was published in an article titled "From Purdah to Couture: Naina Shah Speaks Up." Raised in a conservative Gujarati family, Naina was educated in the best schools in Bombay before marrying into a wealthy family. Her husband's family insisted that she stay at home rather than pursuing her dream of opening her own boutique.

Yet following the return of her brother-in-law from his education in the United States, Naina's in-laws decided that it was unfair to keep their daughter in *purdah* any longer. "They are much more enlightened abroad," she said in the course of the interview, "and so when he came back, he educated my family and told them I should be more free." Naina positions her brother as a quasi-foreign authority in this example, whose "enlightened" knowledge enabled her to start her own business with financial backing from her in-laws.

One of the first big orders that Naina received was from the Italian fashion house Versace, which had commissioned delicate embroidered cloth pieces to be used for a line of evening gowns. This was of interest to *Femina*, as the name Versace carries unmatched cultural cache in South Bombay. Although very few people could actually afford to wear it, all of the members of the culture of celebrity would recognize the kind of status that this accords Naina. Yet, positioned in the international division of labor as she is, it is crucial to remember that Naina is not paid nearly enough by Versace to be able to buy such a gown herself without family support.

Naina situated herself vis-à-vis this internationally renowned fashion house by emphasizing what she described as her own initial “unprofessionalism”:

You see, in India we still don’t have standards, and someone who is a buyer for Versace, they won’t stand for that. If they call me and need one hundred embroidered pieces by Tuesday, and I don’t provide them, someone else will—and they have to be perfect, not like in India where you can get away with a few days here or there, or something which is imperfectly executed in terms of craftsmanship. So it was really a learning experience for me, to bring themselves up to their standards from my state of unprofessionalism.

Naina’s positioning of herself at the bottom of a hierarchy of standards in relationship to the House of Versace speaks to issues addressed throughout this chapter, namely, that liberalization has capitalized on a deep-seated sense of inferiority among Indians, whether by means of Indian-made products or even aesthetic standards of quality, such as beauty products or film industries.

Femina chose to make reference to this in the article “From Purdah to Couture” by situating two very different styles of dress, which are often culturally bounded, as part of a discourse of evolution. Notably, the title insists on the progression of its subject from *purdah*—a state of being normally associated with the village and a lack of education—to couture, which has only become widely known in India following the advent of liberalization. Perhaps for this reason, the educated, and even humbled, tone of Naina’s interview is evident in the face of such international greatness.

Yet the question remains where to situate individuals in the greater scheme of post-liberalization South Bombay. Who, for example, is Naina Shah, or film star Aamir Khan? What does it mean to set “international standards” in Bollywood, an industry whose very name refers to the better financed and organized film industry in Hollywood? Again, it is best to view

all of this as part of a larger process, a molding of identity in which people position themselves vis-à-vis others as part of a larger contextual framework in which what it means to be an urban Indian is in flux.

Writing about the slippery character of identity in *Mimesis and Alterity*, Michael Taussig is adamant that “there is no such thing as identity in any grand sense . . . nevertheless, the masks of appearance do more than suffice. They are an absolute necessity” (1993, 254). The masks that are worn by social actors whose lives are described throughout this paper are variable and based upon the social situation in which they find themselves. Following this line of thought, it may be concluded that a more diverse understanding of South Asian popular culture is needed in order to know what it means to live in post-liberalization and postmodern Bombay.

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“Eve’s Sin” (“Hawwa ka Gunah”)

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INTRODUCTION

Wajeda Tabassum (b. 1935) is an Urdu author from Hyderabad, India (now living in Bombay), who has published twenty-eight books and received much critical acclaim—both positive and negative—among Urdu-language audiences. Yet, because only one of her stories is available in English, Tabassum’s work is little known to non-Urdu-language readers. Many of her stories are set in Hyderabad during the reign of the last Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan (r. 1911-48), who was unseated in 1948 by the Government of India’s “police action.” Discussions in history books of the police action and the forced entry of Hyderabad into the Indian Union tend to focus on the domain of high politics: on the positions of Nehru, Sardar Patel, Mountbatten, and Churchill vis-à-vis the question of Hyderabad’s independence.² Tabassum was a teenager living in Hyderabad when the police action occurred. Her stories, many of which are critical of the nawabi aristocracy of Hyderabad, bring a unique perspective to this period by featuring female protagonists who lived and worked in the Nizam’s domains, and raise issues that were emerging as central concerns to the women’s movement during the 1970s.

¹ Lengthier versions of this introduction were presented at the 31st Annual Conference on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin on October 13, 2002 and at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting on March 28, 2003. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Wajeda Tabassum for generously granting me permission to translate this story, and also to Wajeda’s sons for their hospitality and their help in locating several of Wajeda Tabassum’s books. I would also like to thank Professors S. Akbar Hyder and Martha Ann Selby for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this translation. All errors, of course, are my own.

² For instance, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy,” in Omar Khalidi, ed., *Hyderabad: After the Fall* (Wichita, Kansas: Hyderabad Historical Society, 1988), 1-25; K. Chandraiah, *Hyderabad: 400 Glorious Years* (Hyderabad: Suraj Printers, 1996), especially pp. 302-308; Vasant Kumar Bawa, “The Seventh Nizam,” in *Hyderabad: The Power of Glory* (Hyderabad: Deccan Books, 1998), 7-16.

The only story by Wajeda Tabassum that has been translated into English to date is “Utran,” a controversial story that was denounced by many male critics in India who alleged that the heroine’s behavior was inappropriate for a Muslim woman.³ The story was widely appreciated by women, however. For instance, several months after its publication, the members of the women’s literary gathering, the Bazm-e-Urdu of Lucknow, listed Tabassum as one of their three favorite writers, placing her alongside Ismat Chughtai and Qurratulain Hyder.⁴ And since its original publication in 1977 in a women’s magazine, “Utran” has been translated into eight languages, filmed for television, and used by the film director Mira Nair as the inspiration for her film “Kamasutra” (1996).⁵

The story that follows, “Eve’s Sin,” is a translation of the original Urdu short story “Hawwa ka Gunah” by Wajeda Tabassum, which was first published in her short story collection *Phul Khilne Do (Let the Buds Bloom)*, (1977). “Eve’s Sin” tells the story of Champa, an outcaste woman who is sold to a wealthy judge for thirty rupees during a famine. The story begins with a reference to the bell that is rung whenever anyone comes to the judge seeking justice. Initially, the narrator associates this bell with the fairness and piety of the judge. However, by the time the bell is rung for Champa’s case at the end of the story, this image has been corrupted. By framing this story with the bell, Tabassum calls into question the whole judicial system, wherein upper caste men are the executors of justice and outcaste women are left to beg for scraps at justice’s door. In my opinion, the title “Eve’s Sin” holds particular salience in this context, referring on the one hand to the narrator’s own loss of innocence as she is birthed into the world of adult knowledge, and on the other hand to Champa’s sin—the sin of an outcaste woman who breastfeeds a high-caste baby. The figure of Eve was a powerful one for women writing throughout the world in the 1970s, particularly in the wake of International Women’s Year in 1975. Eve then symbolized the cruelty of patriarchal systems and represented the plight of womankind as a whole. In this story, Champa—like Eve—is evicted and punished by the patriarchal authority for her transgression. Yet, as with Eve, in Champa’s case we are left asking

³ See Susie Tharu and K. Lalita, eds., *Women Writing in India: Vol. II* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 410.

⁴ Evelyn D. Varady, “Bazm-e-Urdu, Lucknow: A Women’s Response to the Decline of Urdu,” *Annual of Urdu Studies*, 1 (1981), 96.

⁵ For a translation of “Utran,” see Rasheed Moosavi, Vasantha Kannabiran, and Syed Sirajuddin, “Castoffs,” in Susie Tharu and K. Lalita, eds., *Women Writing in India: Vol. II* (New Delhi: Oxford U.P., 1993), 411-6.

powerful questions: Was her action really a sin? And was justice truly served through her punishment?

Although no translation can possibly do justice to the formal means by which Tabassum represents Indian women's lived experience—for instance, through her usage of women's speech patterns and a rural Dakkani dialect of Urdu—I hope that this translation nonetheless conveys some of the power of this author's unique voice. Despite being criticized, spoken about dismissively, and even censored, Wajeda Tabassum has continued to write, maintaining that her writing is so powerful because a religious force inspires her.⁶ Tabassum writes with great sympathy for marginalized and downtrodden women, no matter what religious community, class, or caste they belong to. Through her writing, she expresses her conviction that if women from all segments of society unite, they can together alter the patriarchal structures that are present in their daily lives. This belief in the power of a universal sisterhood was one common to female activists of the 1970s, and it is from this perspective that Tabassum's stories of mid-twentieth century Hyderabad are written.⁷

⁶ Wajeda Tabassum, interviewed by the author in Bombay, March 24, 2002.

⁷ See glossary following the translation.

EVE'S SIN

When famine struck the village, Raghu *Camar* sold his young daughter, Champa, to Grandpa Jan for thirty rupees. Grandpa Jan wasn't willing to give even thirty rupees, but *Phupha* Uncle, *Mamu* Uncle and the boys put the fear of God into him, convincing him to show some mercy, and so he agreed. Raghu *Camar* continued to stand there stock-still while Grandpa Jan poured plenty of taunts into his bag along with the thirty rupees. Grief over the loss of the thirty rupees was tormenting Grandpa Jan. Flaring up, he said, "Why don't you take her with you to the city?"

"Yes, Master. But she's a young girl. And on top of that she's a widow. My heart is not convinced it's the right thing—I'm afraid of the times."

"Hurrumph. Afraid of the times!" Grandpa Jan gurgled loudly on his *hookah*. "As if we don't know! She goes around the whole village making eyes at everyone!" (This was the real reason for his anger.)

How could Raghu move his tongue in front of the "Master"? He continued to stand there helplessly with his head bowed. Champa looked at Grandpa Jan with such sparkling and consuming glances that for a minute even he was thoroughly stunned. In an effort to maintain his dignity he said, "Oh, the honor of you people—is that any kind of honor? If it were up to me, I wouldn't allow the likes of you to even enter my house. It's only because a girl is needed to wash the diapers of the newborn, *Nannhe Miyan*—it's only for this reason that we'll keep this *Camar* woman." With complete disgust and a loud "patak" sound he spit into the spittoon.

At first it was a food famine in the village, and then a money famine. Well, there had always been a money famine. But at Grandpa Jan's place there was no such thing. Whenever the British government would become happy about one thing or another, they'd grant several villages to my Great-Great-Grandfather. These British rulers were good: whenever they were happy they gave away lands. So now all the villages belonged to my Grandpa Jan. He alone was the government. And he, too, was a very good ruler. He was quite a pious man, he helped the poor a lot, and if he saw that someone was negligent of religion, then he would have their ears pulled. Religion had made him very sympathetic towards the poor, because according to our religion the poor should also be considered human beings. Grandpa Jan had systematically renewed *Jahangir's* justice. Truly, there was a bell that hung from the big door, and those bearing complaints rang it and obtained justice.

Even now, when Raghu *Camar* came with his daughter, it was impossible for Grandpa Jan to say no. At once he took out thirty rupees from his moneybox and threw it towards him. Well, who else would give even thirty

rupees for such an ill-behaved woman? But it was difficult for Grandpa Jan to kick a poor person in the stomach.

Raghu Camar tucked the thirty rupees into his *dhoti* and left for the city that very day. Well, with whom could he stay in the village? An age had passed since his wife died. As a young girl Champa would spend her whole day frolicking about here and there. Then one day her father grabbed her and married her off in front of four witnesses. But destiny was so powerful that the whole year hadn't completely passed before her husband died. Then after her husband died a son was born, who died a year later from pneumonia. In two years all of life's paths had been closed to her, and until this day she had remained with her father. People said that she was no good, that she wandered the streets staring at the young children. Someone speculated that she was roaming around looking for her deceased ones. Several times this subject had come up in Grandpa Jan's court, and every time Grandpa Jan reprimanded Raghu, telling him that if he did not keep an eye on her from then on, he would throw both of them out of the village. By now they should have been thrown out. But here again, Grandpa Jan's tender-heartedness had intervened.

And now, once again, she had to come to our door!

In those days, I was too clever for my own good, and it was my habit to get to the bottom of everything. Like Columbus with his determination to discover a new world, I was similarly bent upon discovering new things.

Phuphi Auntie's youngest child, Nannhe Miyan, had just come into the world. Our household's first nanny was no longer able to look after the children along with washing their sodden diapers. Now we owned the village, so there was no shortage of servants. But on that day when Raghu came with Champa, Grandpa Jan raised no objection whatsoever, even though he knew that Grandma Jan wouldn't allow any outcaste *Dhers* or Camars to enter the house, lest there be some negative impact on the children. (The truth, however, was that it wasn't the children but the elders of our household that received the negative impact.)

When Champa came to the house, Grandma Jan pitched a powerful fit right away, saying, "I'll never let this happen, not in a thousand years! Such a ripe young girl, such a good-looking little tramp! I won't let her touch these dirty diapers. What, have all the other servants gone and died?"

But Grandpa Jan gently explained the situation, saying, "Dear wife, the matter of having the diapers washed is merely an excuse. She's a poor girl, there's a famine in the village, and her father has left for the city. Where should the poor thing go? Think of this as a charity case, dear, and if such a fear troubles you, then don't allow her to enter into the business of the house. She can stay

over in the servant's quarters. Whether she lives or dies, what's the difference?"

And Champa was an odd, stupid girl. No matter how much people tried to explain things to her, still she couldn't begin to understand them. I began to understand Grandpa and Grandma Jan's anger. Though I forbade her a thousand times, still she couldn't refrain from taking Nannhe Miyan onto her lap, laying him down, and hugging him. She listened to me only to the extent that in Grandma Jan's presence she wouldn't take him into her lap. For if Grandma Jan were to see, then she'd pull Champa's ears while shouting, "Now the time has come that even the pups of those wretched Camars are picking up our children!"

Well, the question of Champa going near the place for prayers or near the Quran didn't arise, for she wasn't even allowed to come into the hallway. Grandma Jan would scold her for no reason, but otherwise Champa was fine. She did her work at such a quick pace that she'd pant, out of breath. And slowly her list of chores began to grow. While at first she was taken in only to wash the baby's dirty diapers, now her responsibilities extended to the water buffaloes, hens, deer, and pigeons, too. She was the one who saw to their grain and fodder. She exercised the pigeons, bathed the deer in the pond, and fed the grain to the hens and fodder to the water buffaloes. The poor thing works from dawn to dusk. And if she gets any spare time to herself, then she spends it playing with Nannhe Miyan.

"Look, Champa," I threatened her, "don't lay a hand on the child. If Grandma Jan were to see you, she'd kill you!"

"Sister, what can I do?" she replied sadly. "Whenever I look at the child I remember my own Rajjan." Her eyes grew moist, and in a voice choked with tears she said, "When he died, sister, my milk wasn't even dry. He was only a year old. After his death it was as though something was boiling up inside me, and then streams of milk began to overflow from my breasts."

Terrified, I looked to and fro to make sure that no one had seen me standing near Champa, and then, in my desire to discover new things, I moved even closer to her, wishing in my heart that nothing would break her narration of events. But the wretch got all flustered up in her tears, and then held her breath, growing silent. Oh, the poor thing! My heart was overflowing with mercy and compassion. How unfortunate she is. One way or another, whether good or bad, I found ways to keep on talking to her. But one day my sympathy for Champa disappeared. With my own eyes I clearly saw her emerging from the water buffaloes' barn, and behind her Phupha Uncle also emerged. Mother had taught us well that we shouldn't speak to boys alone. It's bad behavior. So then why was Champa in the dark barn with Phupha Uncle?

I asked her: "What kind of behavior is this, Champa?"

Well, she wasn't startled at all! She said plainly, "Master doesn't pay any attention to my clothes. The young master heard about this somehow and came to give me some money himself."

In my heart some slumbering doubt began to awaken. The stories that I had read secretly in Mamu Uncle's room began to stir up in my mind. I had truly become like Columbus, and asked in a secretive voice: "Freely—for nothing?"

She replied, in the same astonished manner: "Why for nothing? He asked for a slap."

A slap? I began to tremble, from head to foot. "And you gave it to him?"

"Well, what can you get for free in this world?"

"Be quiet, you slut!" I was boiling with anger.

Grandma Jan had indeed spoken correctly when she said that such women shouldn't even be allowed to set foot in the house. If Champa had asked me for a *dupatta*, then wouldn't I have given her one? In that instant I felt all of my compassion vanish.

Now, our house is so big that even if four marriage processions were to descend into it, still we wouldn't feel a stir. At such a place, who cares for anyone else? Had I wanted, I could have lived with Champa in peace. But it was as if my own being had been polluted. Okay, when elders warn you that there's something wrong in a certain thing, what is the benefit of taking that thing upon oneself?

I saw that Champa was still secretly kissing and hugging Nannhe Miyan. Taking the nanny with her, she'd take him to the southern garden, so that they were completely separate from the big house. Grandma Jan hadn't found out about Champa's behavior, but Champa was loving the child uncontrollably and happily saying, "This is my Rajjan."

It was a good thing that there was only goodness in my heart. Otherwise, just imagine if I'd gone and told Grandma Jan!? Hunh! She calls the child "Rajjan" and yet is still alive. That slut.

Gradually, Champa's "virtues" began to manifest themselves, and then everyone learned what she was really all about. The wretch could neither be thrown out nor kept. Grandpa Jan had majestic blood, and he'd seen the days of the British Raj; he had an awesome presence. Had he only become fond of her . . . but he didn't really pay any attention to her. "She's a poor tramp—where else can she go? If thrown out, she'd certainly become a prostitute," he said to Grandma Jan.

In my heart, I felt that I should tell them what I'd seen, but I remained silent. Why should I interfere? But whenever I recall that conversation, I become terrified. Well, what good is it for a woman to stoop down so low?

My anger subsided, however, the moment I noticed that Champa was terribly sad and worried. Her eyes had begun to seem perpetually moist. That day I forgot all of the old stuff and asked her why she was sad.

“Nannhe Miyan isn’t feeling well,” she replied.

“What happened to the child?” I asked, concerned, “He seems fine.”

“How could he be fine? His mother’s milk has dried up, and now they’re using animal’s milk. He can’t digest it. And in addition, he has diarrhea. I had to change and wash his diapers all night long.”

“Diarrhea?” I asked, frightened, because no one who got diarrhea in the village recovered quickly. The atmosphere of the village was that bad. The patient would die, but not the disease.

“Yes, the *hakim* has given a prescription for the diarrhea.”

From that day forward, I never again saw that glow on her face, nor that bounce in her step as she went about her work: humming while she was chasing the hens into their cage, frolicking with the deer, and jumping about with the pigeons. Now she was always at Nannhe Miyan’s bedside, gazing upon him. She had seen Rajjan’s face in the child, so perhaps she was afraid that like Rajjan, this child too might be snatched away from her.

That day she began to ask the nanny: “O, sister, why hasn’t some woman been hired to take care of your Nannhe Miyan?”

The nanny looked at Champa, confused. “You mean we should hire a wet-nurse?”

“Yes, yes!” Champa said, happily, “This is exactly what I’m saying.”

The nanny replied, hissing, “It’s a good thing that you said this only to me, you ignorant thing! Has this stigma ever been taken on by noble families? Who knows what the consequence may be of certain women’s milk? I’ve been here long enough to watch my hair turn white, but still I’ve never seen these children drink any other woman’s milk—only milk from the upper-caste lady-folk. How could you even think of such a thing?”

Champa’s face fell. She didn’t utter a word. Slowly she gathered up the dirty diapers and went to the pond.

That night I couldn’t sleep at all after Champa told me a ghost story. A teenage girl shouldn’t be so timid, but there was no remedy for that, since our wretched house was so large and echoing that ghosts and spirits leapt from every corner and frightened me.

I picked up my quilt and pillow and trembling, called out to the nanny. At that time she was looking after Nannhe Miyan, whose constant cries had become a burden. And Champa was sitting like a corpse near the cradle. The nanny came at my call, and I saw that her eyes were heavy with the need to sleep. “Poor old woman,” I thought with compassion.

“Why aren’t you sleeping, Auntie?” I said to the nanny, and then continued in a louder, irritated voice, “And why isn’t there anyone looking after the boy?”

Fast as an arrow, Champa rose up and said, “Miss, I’ve been telling her to go sleep for some time, but she won’t listen. I’ll remain awake.”

“I’m afraid of bad dreams, so I can’t sleep either, Auntie,” I said by way of explanation to the nanny. “You go sleep. Champa and I will look after him.”

I took the boy. Oh, he was light as a flower, and wilted, without any life in him. “Certainly he will die soon,” I thought to myself.

After rocking the baby a few times I grew tired, as sleep began to overtake me. Handing the boy over to Champa, I put my pillow on the bed there and lay down, wrapped in my quilt.

But while Nannhe Miyan was still crying, it was impossible for me to sleep. The nanny, however, was sleeping happily. Champa was looking after Nannhe Miyan with great concern. But maybe she wasn’t looking after him – Champa was talking to herself in her sleep.

“What a tragedy it is that the mother’s milk has dried up so he has to drink animal’s milk. After all, what harm is there in giving him another woman’s milk? Yes, milk. Perhaps there are different types of milk. Children are all equal. Mothers, too, are equal. Big talk from big shots. Why take the bloodlines so seriously that it threatens a child’s life? After all, the child is unable to swallow the animal’s milk. Just hope he doesn’t die.”

Suddenly she startled herself. “Oh, what have I said? May his enemies die! After all, this is my Rajjan.” While saying this, she tightly embraced Nannhe Miyan. Then she put the crying child to her chest and suddenly, he was silent. I don’t know how long it was that Champa held the child at her chest in this manner, but I clearly saw tears flowing from her eyes. Held to her chest, the boy’s mouth began to grope around, and I saw, too, that Champa gave milk to him, just like Phuphi Auntie had.

There was such satisfaction, such happiness, such joy radiating from Champa’s face—I could see it, but don’t have the words to express it. So many days have passed since then, but still I can’t find the words. She began to stroke Nannhe Miyan’s head. And Nannhe Miyan, lifting his mouth from the milk, looked at Champa’s face, and in that moment, I saw streams of milk flowing from Champa’s breasts!

Milk. Where did this milk come from? I may have been just a girl, but somehow or other I understood this much—that only women with young children have milk. So . . . So how did Champa? She didn’t have any children. She had once, but he had died. So? So?

And, lost in this cycle of thoughts, I finally fell asleep.

The next day, not only did liveliness reappear on Nannhe Miyan's face, but he had less diarrhea too. The hakim felt his medical wisdom deserved the credit, and the *mullah* thought the credit should go to the water that he had made holy by blowing on it. The whole household was tumultuous in its happiness, for Phupha Uncle had five girls, but this was the first son, and his life had been in grave danger. And today was the first in many days that there was some hope for his life.

And so it happened that within ten to twelve days Nannhe Miyan's cheeks had become apples. The diarrhea, fever, the crying and wailing—all had vanished. Champa's cheeks were also glowing with hope. It was as if that feeble woman had suddenly become an audacious, prancing deer.

Then one day, after becoming upset over one thing or another, Nannhe Miyan began to cry. Champa's heart skipped a beat. I don't know what happened to her when she saw Nannhe Miyan crying (even today I still haven't found out), but she clutched her chest with both of her hands, and within a few seconds streams of milk had begun to overflow her bodice. This was such a strange and conspicuous occurrence that it couldn't remain secret for long. Everyone was disturbed; they began to look at one another, some in astonishment and some in anger. Grandma Jan, who had been vigilantly waiting for a disaster, said: "Surely she must have put her breasts in some child's mouth."

"What difference does that make?" said *Mumani* Auntie.

"How can it not make a difference? The dried-up milk begins to overflow." Suddenly she jumped on Champa. "Why, you whore! What have you done? Speak!"

So many eyes were piercing her that she had nowhere to run. There was no other option but to tell the truth. Quietly, she said: "I breast-fed Nannhe Miyan."

"Nannhe Miyan?"

"Nannhe Miyan?"

"Nannhe Miyan?"

The whole household was in an uproar. O God, what will become of Nannhe Miyan's life, now that he has drunk this harlot's milk? His blood will surely manifest the consequence of this. But how could she do such a thing? How did that ill-mannered harlot dare?!

"I couldn't stand to watch him crying. He seemed just like my own son, I swear by God. Well, why else would the Lord give milk to a woman? For the child, right? So how could I just watch him cry?"

The bell of justice rang. Grandpa Jan arrived with due pomp and graced his royal chair with his dignified presence. He was trembling with anger over

Nannhe Miyan. He was foaming at the mouth. With a roar, he said to the secretary: "Summon Kallu the butcher."

When Kallu came, Grandpa Jan turned to him and commanded: "Cut off that slut's breasts and throw them out."

GLOSSARY

- Camar* - an untouchable caste that traditionally worked with leather
Dher - another untouchable caste
Dhoti - a type of loincloth worn by some men
Dupatta - a shawl worn by women, also a symbol of a woman's modesty
Hakim - a physician
Hookah - a type of Asian pipe for smoking tobacco
Jahangir - Mughal Emperor who ruled in India from 1605-1627
Mamu - mother's brother
Mullah - a priest
Mumani - mother's brother's wife
Nannhe Miyan - respectful term for a child; the "little sir"
Phupha - father's sister's husband
Phuphi - father's sister

Global Web Resources on Afghanistan and South Asia

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New innovations and emerging technologies have influenced all types of libraries and institutions throughout the globe. In Europe and North America we find a large number of web resources developed during the last decade for disseminating current and relevant information. In recent years a number of online databases and networks have also been developed for science and technology in Afghanistan and South Asian countries. It is felt that there is a need for more online resources in the areas of social sciences, humanities and arts. Therefore more efforts should be made to produce qualitative web sites in English, as well as in vernacular languages. In view of the vast scope of Afghanistan and South Asia, and the development of online sources, this paper presents only a sampling of useful Internet resources and networks.

RESOURCES ON AFGHANISTAN

About Afghanistan is a collection of various web resources about Afghanistan.
<http://www.aboutafghanistan.com/>

Afghanistan Government website is a comprehensive official web site maintained by the government.
<http://www.afghanistans.com>

Afghanistan Higher Education Reconstruction: The Ministry of Higher Education of Afghanistan strives to revitalize the institutions of higher learning in Afghanistan, and it intends to transform Afghan universities and colleges into communities where an environment of scholarly integrity, academic freedom, research and teaching excellence, and personal and intellectual growth predominates.
<http://afghanhighered.lib.calpoly.edu/>

Afghan Network was started as an email newsletter and slowly evolved into a website. The idea for this website was discussed as early as 1997, and was first launched in January 1998.

<http://www.afghan-network.net/>

Afghanistan Online is a privately owned, independent web site that provides updated news and information on Afghanistan. Originally known as the Qazi Web page on Afghanistan, its title has been changed to Afghanistan Online.

<http://www.afghan-web.com>

Afghanistan on the Web:

<http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/af.html>

Afghanistan Press Agency: This website was created in 1998 by a Belgo-French student dedicated to providing the public with up-to-date, accurate, and both factual and opinionated information about everything related to Afghanistan.

<http://www.afgha.com>

The Afghan Women's Association International is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization formed in 1992 for the purpose of establishing and defending the basic rights of Afghan women. Its members are women residing in Afghanistan, Europe, Pakistan, and the United States.

<http://www.awai.org>

Directory of Online Resources for the Study of Afghanistan:

<http://www.academicinfo.net/afghan.html>

Education in Afghanistan is a comprehensive listing of schools, colleges, and universities in the country.

<http://www.internationaleducationmedia.com/afganistan/>

Global Information Networks in Education:

<http://www.ginie.org/countries/afghanistan2/>

Government of Afghanistan:

<http://www.afhangovernment.org>

History of Afghanistan:

http://www.ukans.edu/history/VL/middle_east/afghanistan.html

History of Afghanistan:

<http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/History/Default.htm>

Institute for Afghan Studies is a non-profit, non-political, and independent organization, founded and run by young Afghan scholars from around the globe. The mission of the Institute is to be a center for research and a credible source of information about Afghanistan. It promotes research on social, economic, political, and other issues of critical importance pertaining to Afghanistan by providing a forum and soliciting contributions from recognized Afghan and non-Afghan scholars, think-tanks, and experts on Afghan studies.

<http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org>

Online Newspaper—My Afghan is an educational non-profit resource tool located in the United States, and provides news related to Afghanistan from reliable worldwide sources. This site gathers news articles into a single location for easy research.

<http://www.myafghan.com/>

Rebuilding Afghanistan: The main mission of this website is to serve as a virtual point of contact among all those willing to participate in the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

<http://www.rebuild-afghanistan.com/>

Resources on the Women and the Taliban includes over nine web sites relating to Taliban and women.

http://www.depts.drew.edu/wmst/StudentRes/www_Taliban.htm

Society of Afghan Engineers is a private non-profit and non-political corporation whose purpose is to foster international support and to encourage financial and technical assistance for the reconstruction and prosperity of Afghanistan. This society was formed in 1993 by a group of Afghan engineers in Northern Virginia and the surrounding areas who believe that they have a moral responsibility to help the people of Afghanistan.

<http://www.afghan-engineers.org/>

The Voice of Afghanistan:

<http://www.voiceofafghanistan.com/>

Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan (WAPHA) is a non-partisan, non-profit and independent organization founded to achieve full restoration of human rights for Afghan women and girls; Afghan women's full

participation in the peace processes and future government of Afghanistan; full participation of Afghan women in every aspect of Afghan socio-cultural system including educational, political, economical and medical systems; and the full participation a Afghan Women in reconstruction of Afghanistan.

<http://www.wapha.org>

RESOURCES ON SOUTH ASIA

Networks

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) provides a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work together in a spirit of friendship, trust, and understanding. Its documentation center and library, located in New Delhi, provides information services to Member States.

<http://www.saarc-sec.org>

SAN (South Asian Network) promotes the health and empowerment of people of South Asian origin living in California, and fills a critical gap in the South Asian Community, which traditionally has been underserved by public interest organizations.

<http://www.southasiannetwork.org>

SARAI (South Asia Resource Access on the Internet) is hosted by Columbia University, and is one of the best sources for finding web based information in South Asian studies. It provides useful links to reference and bibliographical resources, e-journals, e-news, e-books, and the International Directory of South Asian scholars.

<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/southasia/cuvl>

SARN (South Asia Research Network) has been created to promote the production, exchange, and dissemination of basic research information in the social sciences and humanities. It provides links to electronic publications, research notes, abstracts, research centers, and conferences.

<http://sarn.ssrc.org>

SASNET (Swedish South Asian Studies Network) is a national network for research, education, and information about South Asia, based at Lund University. It encourages and promotes open and dynamic networking, in which Swedish researchers cooperate with researchers in South Asia and around the globe.

<http://www.sasnet.lu.se/sasnetf.html>

SAWNET (South Asian Women Network) is a useful medium of communication about South Asian women. It exists entirely in the electronic medium and its mailing list is run by a group of volunteer moderators that reaches over 700 women in four continents.

<http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/users/sawweb/sawnet>

INFLIBNET (Information and Library Network Centre) is the product of Indian University Grants Commission involved in creating infrastructure for sharing information among academic and research institutions. It is a good source for books, serials, and theses databases available in Indian university libraries.

<http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/index.jsp>

Projects

CSAL (Center for South Asian Libraries) is an American overseas research center developed to facilitate scholarly research and teaching on South Asia through improved preservation of and access to the heritage of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. It provides research support facility for American scholars by providing infrastructures and facilities for the enhancement of research and the exchange of scholarly information.

<http://dsal.uchicago.edu/csai>

DSAL (Digital South Asia Library) is a project of the Center for Research Libraries, which provides digital materials for reference and research on South Asia to scholars, public officials, and other users. This project has been funded by the Association of Research Libraries' Global Resources Program, with support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Several dictionaries, reference books, and journals have been digitized and are available free on the web.

<http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference>

SALRP (South Asian Literary Recordings Project) records the voices of prominent authors reading excerpts from their works. Recordings are available in Real media and MP3 formats.

<http://www.loc.gov/acq/ovop/delhi/salrp/about.html>

SAMP (South Asia Microform Project) is a cooperative program that acquires and maintains a readily accessible collection of unique materials in microform. Materials are collected both through the filming efforts of the project and through the purchase of copies of materials filmed by institutions and companies. It strives

to cooperate with libraries and archives worldwide in preserving unique or endangered materials for the study of South Asia.

<http://www.crl.edu/areastudies/SAMP/index.htm>

Universal Library Project is the result of the collaborative efforts of professionals and educationists from India, China, and United States. It has begun the digitization of materials in South Indian languages.

<http://delta.ulib.org/html/index.html>

Vidyanidhi is a database of Indian doctoral theses established to evolve as an online resource. It is funded by the Ford Foundation and Microsoft.

<http://www.vidyanidhi.org.in/home/index.html>

Portal to Asian Internet Resources (PAIR) is a cooperative project of the Ohio State University Libraries, the University of Minnesota Libraries, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries. The project provides a user-friendly, searchable catalog with quick and easy access to high-quality Web resources originating in Asia, which are identified, evaluated, selected and cataloged by area library specialists. The catalog offers an entry point to quality Asian materials that are neither easily identifiable nor usable due to the limitations of existing search engines. Materials support research and teaching in higher education and benefit scholars who do not have ready access to the expertise of area library specialists and collections of major research libraries.

<http://webcat.library.wisc.edu:3200/PAIR/index.html>

Institutions

AIBS (American Institute of Bangladesh) is a consortium of U.S. institutions involved in research on Bangladesh, the development of educational institutions in Bangladesh, faculty exchanges, and sending U.S. graduate as well as undergraduate student to Bangladesh.

<http://www.aibs.net>

AIIS (American Institute of Indian Studies) is a consortium of universities and colleges in the United States through which scholars actively engage in teaching and research about India.

<http://www.indiastudies.org>

AIPS (American Institute of Pakistan Studies) encourages and supports research on issues relevant to Pakistan and the promotion of scholarly exchange between the United States and Pakistan.

<http://www.pakistanstudies-aips.org>

AISLS (American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies) was established to foster excellence in American research and teaching on Sri Lanka, and to promote the exchange of scholars and scholarly information between the United States and Sri Lanka.

<http://www.aisls.org>

Associations

ACSAA (American Council for Southern Asian Art) is a useful source for the study and awareness of the art of South and Southeast Asia. In addition to periodic symposia, usually held every two years, ACSAA pursues these goals through various projects, including its bi-annual newsletter, bibliographies, a color slide project, a microfiche archive, and outreach materials.

<http://kaladarshan.arts.ohio-state.edu/acsaahp.html>

ALIVA (Asia Library & Information Virtual Association) is the only virtual association of Asia's library and information professionals. The secretariat is located in Bangkok.

<http://aliva.org/html/about.html>

ANHS (Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies) provides a platform for people with wide-ranging interests in the Himalayan region. It aims to raise the profile of the world's highest region, increasing awareness of the unequalled diversity of human and natural worlds within the Himalaya-Hindukush.

<http://www.macalester.edu/~guneratne/index.html>

BASAS (British Association for South Asian Studies) is the largest academic association in the United Kingdom for the study of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and the South Asian Diaspora.

<http://www.staff.brad.ac.uk/akundu/basas>

CONSALD (Committee on South Asian Libraries and Documentation) has been created to develop, organize, and coordinate information resources and services in Canada and United States.

<http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/Lib/consald.html>

ISOSA (Independent Scholars of South Asia) provides an academic home for those with a passion for South Asia and a commitment to serious scholarship, but a without a tenure track academic position.

<http://www.indiastudies.org/isosa>

SAAG (South Asia Analysis Group) is a non-profit non-commercial think tank. Its objective is to advance strategic analysis and contribute to the expansion of knowledge of Indian and international security and promote public understanding.

<http://www.saag.org>

SACAP (South Asia Cooperative Acquisitions Program) is operated by the Library of Congress New Delhi Office for the benefit of the libraries in Canada and U.S. It identifies and acquires catalogs and distributes a wide variety of library materials.

<http://www.locdelhi.org>

SAALG (South Asia Archives & Library Group) consists of representatives from libraries, archives, and other institutions in the United Kingdom with specialization in South Asian Studies. Its aim is to acquire books, manuscripts and archival materials.

<http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/users/gae/NCOLR/salg1.htm>

SAJA (South Asian Journalists Association) foster ties among South Asian journalists in North America to improve standards of journalistic coverage of South Asia and South Asian Americans.

<http://www.saja.org>

SALTA (South Asian Teachers Association) is a professional organization whose mission is to encourage more effective cooperation among instructors and educators of South Asian languages, linguistics, and literatures in colleges and universities in North America

<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/salta>

SSAS (Society for South Asian Studies) supports advanced research in history, visual and material culture, ethnography, language, religion, and literature. It publishes an annual journal, *South Asian Studies*.

<http://www.britac.ac.uk/institutes/SSAS>

Subscription Databases

AIIEBIP (All India Index to English Books in Print) is the first electronic version of Indian Books in Print that lists thousands of books not found in elsewhere, along with prices. A directory of Indian publishers with complete addresses and contact details is also included.

<http://www.nisc.com/factsheets/qebip.asp>

BAS (Bibliography of Asian Studies) is on-line version of the Bibliography of Asian Studies containing records on all subjects (especially humanities and social sciences) pertaining to East, Southeast, and South Asia published worldwide from 1971 to the present.

<http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/b/bas>

DELNET (Developing Library Network) provides a Union Catalogue of books, Union list of current periodicals, CD-ROM databases, database of Indian specialists, database of periodical articles, Union list of video recordings, Urdu manuscripts' database, and a database of theses and dissertations on India.

<http://delnet.nic.in/>

India Statistics provides an wealth of socio-economic statistical facts and figures culled from various secondary-level sources. Over a half million pages of statistical data have been qualitatively analyzed, condensed, and presented in a user-friendly format.

<http://www.indiastat.com>

ISID (Index to Social Sciences Periodicals) is an on-line index of over one hundred Indian Social Science journals and press clippings files of national English dailies.

<http://isidev.nic.in/odb.html>

Online Collections

Books: A list of online books available free on the web can be accessed at:

http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/online_books.htm

Serials: Web based access to online journals can be found at:

<http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/serials.htm#Online>

SALIN (South Asian Libraries & Information Networks) is an online journal that presents the review of South Asian libraries, information networks, programs, and services.

<http://www.universitypunjabi.org/pages/dlis/salin/salin.htm>.

Newspapers: There are two popular sites that provides links to newspapers published in South Asia.

http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/online_newspapers.htm

and <http://oldsite.library.upenn.edu/vanpelt/collections/sasia/webpapers.html>.

South Asian OPACs

As the result of modernization, several libraries in South Asian countries have provided access to their Online Public Access Catalogue (OPAC) from their web sites to benefit researchers from all over the world. A list of some of these libraries is available at:

<http://www.infolibrarian.com/opac.htm>

and <http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~gb4k-ktr/indexeca.htm>

Miscellaneous

The Country Studies' site of the University of Illinois Library provides detailed links to South Asian countries.

http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/country_studies.htm

Countries information can also be accessed at:

http://www.asiasource.org/profiles/ap_mp_02_southasia.cfm

Languages Learning Resources:

http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/languages_resources.htm

NLSIU (National Law School Article Index) is an index of Indian articles from the current journals received by the library and is available free online.

<http://www.nls.ac.in/lib/articles/index.html>

SAGAR is a semi-annual South Asia Graduate Research Journal published at the University of Texas at Austin.

<http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/pages/sagar/index.html>

South Asia Virtual Library is a directory that keeps track of web-based sources for South Asia and is a starting place for exploration.

<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/southasia/cuvl>

The **South Asian Libraries & Information Centres** site provides links to various libraries.

http://door.library.uiuc.edu/asx/SA_libraries.htm

A listing of **US and Canadian Libraries** with South Asian collections is available at:

<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/southasia/cuvl/LIBS.html>

Paul Brass. *Production of Hindu—Muslim Violence*. (Seattle, Washington: Univ of Washington Press, 2003).

Paul Brass's book on communal violence in India is one in a series of books of varying quality that have come out in the aftermath of the pogroms in the Indian state of Gujarat. His treatise, the *Production of Hindu – Muslim Violence*, is a cut above the rest. In it he combines an academic's sense of rigor with an storytelling style, giving the reader a real sense of the culture of violence in Aligarh, a mid-size city in India's largest state of Uttar Pradesh. He argues that violence has been produced by routine politics. This book is not only an important work in the continuing dialogue about the rise of communalism in India, but also allows researchers to extend the analysis beyond South Asia to other areas where violence is used for political means.

Dr. Brass, a professor emeritus at the University of Washington in Seattle, has spent decades studying the political and social fabric in Aligarh. He first debunks the various myths of how the violence, especially the concept of it as an "aberration." For example, the media time and again chooses to minimize the violence as not endemic or perhaps as a one-time affair due to the harm inflicted on the sentiments of the majority community—the Hindus. He lays out the steadily increasing levels of communalism, more often than not perpetuated by the politicians in power or by those who believe that this is a way to gain power. To put it simply, violence wins votes. It won votes in Aligarh for years while effectively marginalizing the Muslim community over the course of decades.

The irony is that Aligarh is home to one of the great contemporary centers of Islamic education—Aligarh Muslim University. Yet even here, where the concept of Pakistan was born, the Muslim community has faced risks and has, to a certain extent, become radicalized themselves, making dialogue between the two large populations even more difficult. Thankfully, as Brass's postscript notes, this dialogue, however difficult, is indeed taking place. If there is one flaw in the book it is a lack of discussion about the production of violence from the Muslim side—how groups of Muslims have also been involved in the production of violence. He does mention this, but does not provide a rigorous analysis as he does of the Hindu side. The painstaking analysis he provides is abundant, to say the least. Brass includes four decades of a longitudinal study where he examined copious volumes of newspaper articles, political tracts, and other documents in the public domain, as well as police reports and hundreds of personal interviews of not only the victims of violence, but also of some of the alleged perpetrators. All in all, this book presents a complete picture of the role of routine politics to garner votes from the majority Hindu community.

In a postscript, he places this book in the context of current affairs in India. Brass expresses both optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, forces of communal harmony have made a concerted effort to prevent further violence. This has worked to some extent, as evidenced by the lack of rioting in Aligarh for the past 10 years. On the other hand, Brass notes that the 2002 riots in Gujarat, in which an estimated 2,000 people were killed (mostly Muslims), have fostered a new sense of despair among minorities and may foretell yet more politics outside of Aligarh, where violence is produced.

As India goes to the polls in a national election in 2004, Brass's book takes on even more significance since commentators, political scientists, and human rights activists will be watching to see whether the election campaign will involve the production of the same sort of routine political violence that is highlighted in this book. Academics working on communal violence and politics in South Asia must make this book a part of their collection to more completely understand the process of marginalization of minority communities.

Govind Acharya – Cornell University

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MATTHEW R. SAYERS is a Ph.D. student in Asian Cultures and Languages at the University of Texas at Austin. His area of research is the development of religious traditions in ancient India, with a focus on the interaction of different religious traditions. He earned an M.A. in Religion at Florida State University and did his undergraduate work at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.

SAGAR: SOUTH ASIA GRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

Call for Papers

SAGAR is a semi-annual research journal edited by graduate students working in the area of South Asia at The University of Texas at Austin. The journal provides a forum for scholars from various institutions and a range of disciplines to publish original research on South Asia—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—and the diaspora. All areas of study are invited: anthropology, art and art history, communication, ethnomusicology, folklore, history, literature, philology, political science, religion, sociology, women's studies, and other related fields.

Article submissions should not be more than 6,250 words (approximately 25 double-spaced pages).

Book reviews should not exceed 800 words. Bibliographies on specific research topics will also be considered for publication. Please e-mail the editor with suggested books and bibliography topics.

Please include full footnotes and bibliographies according to the Chicago Manual of Style; specific style guidelines are available on our website: <http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/pages/sagar/index.html>.

Contributors are required to submit articles either on diskettes or by email in Microsoft Word format. Illustrations and photographs should be submitted unattached; all accompanying captions should be typewritten on a separate page (do not write on the pictures). Tables may be included in the body of the text.

Authors must include their names, addresses, phone numbers, fax numbers, e-mail addresses, titles, universities, and year in graduate school (if applicable). Authors shall retain copyright of their articles if accepted for publication; by submitting articles, however, authors grant SAGAR permission to print them.

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